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SPAIN IN THE UNITED NATIONS: ACTION AND REACTION

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM

AND THE COMMITTEE ON THE GRADUATE DIVISION

OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

By

James Dineen Burden

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May 1963

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PREFACE

This study is an attempt to evaluate the result when a nation like Spain becomes a member of the United Nations. A preliminary look was taken at some of the historical factors that make Spain what she is today, but the focus is on Spain since becoming a member of the United Nations. She was admitted to membership in December of 1955 and the writer's intention was to cover the entire period from 1955 to the present. This was not practical because of the volume of material involved, so the resulting investigation covers the tenth and eleventh sessions of the United Nations, from December 1955 to the end of 1957.

The United Nations Official Records have been drawn on very extensively in this investigation. Such aids as the Hispanic American Report, the United Nations Review, the Department of State Bulletin, and the Economist of London have been invaluable. Among newspapers, the best are the New York Times, the London Times, the Manchester Guardian, ABC, Arriba, Informaciones, Madrid and Pueblo (all of Madrid).

One of the best bibliographies on Spain, its present and past, is that compiled by A. P. Whitaker, in his Spain and the Defense of the West. A critical point is the lack of official material especially since 1945. This is more true of the United States than of Spain. For example, Spanish Foreign Minister Artajo's speech to the Cortes on the 1953 bases agreement was published by the Spanish Foreign Office but as yet there is no American equivalent. Harry Truman's Memoirs (New York: Doubleday,

which is the same as the one in the first part of the book.

and the same is the case with the second part of the book. The first part of the book is devoted to the study of the history of the English language, and the second part is devoted to the study of the English language in the present day.

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1954-1956; 2 v.) do not mention Spain. Neither does Robert Donovan's Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York: Harper, 1956). This is in spite of the fact that the 1953 bases agreement was one of the most important acts of the first year of the Eisenhower administration.

I hasten to add that the opinions and conclusions reached herein are my sole responsibility, and in no way represent the views of the Navy or the Department of Defense. I acknowledge my great indebtedness to Professor James T. Watkins IV for his invaluable advice on content and direction. Needless to say, the shortcomings are my own.

James D. Burden

Mountain View, California

May 1963

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Land

Spain became a member of the United Nations in December of 1955. Her struggle to attain membership and the resulting influences on her domestic and foreign policy are the subject matter for this study. Spain played a role in the Second World War that was widely criticized by the victorious United Nations. This criticism was expressed in the United Nations General Assembly resolution of December 12, 1946 which barred Spain from representation in UN agencies and conferences. Nine years later Spain was accepted in an arrangement by which fifteen other nations were also admitted to United Nations membership. This development and the subsequent directions that Spanish foreign policy took as a result of UN membership are the focus of this investigation.

As any nation would be, Spain today is the result of her past; she reflects her days of glory in the period of Philip II as well as the darker days after the defeat of the Armada. Maderiaga always emphasizes the inaccessibility of Spain. The Iberian Peninsula is like a castle; it stands at a higher mean elevation than any other part of Europe with the exception of Switzerland. The whole country is surrounded by high mountain walls; the Cantabric range on the north; the Sierra de la Estrella on the west; the range of the Andalusian coast on the south; and east, the knot of mountains behind Valencia.

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The Peninsula is thus a vast tableland closed in behind the Pyrenees and the various coastal cordilleras. This tableland is broken up into compartments both by mountain ranges and by deep depressions. The Meseta Central is an archaic formation stretching over two-thirds of the territory at an average altitude of 2000 feet. It is generally considered to be the geological nucleus and the oldest constituent of the Peninsula.¹ It gives the country its most notable characteristics: loftiness, bareness, and space. It lies, slightly tilted in a south-westerly direction, anchored on the Cantabrian range to the north and on the Iberian cordillera to the northeast. It is bounded to the west by a depression which separates it from the Atlantic plain on which lies Portugal; to the southwest by a sheer drop forming a wall at the foot of which falls the Guadalquivir River.

The climate can be classified into two main regions; wet and dry. The frontier between them starts on the Catalan coast, north of the Ebro, running westward past the point where the Iberian and the Catalanian ranges meet; then circling south of the Cantabrian range, it turns southward, following the Portuguese frontier though advancing into Spanish territory on the high lands stretching north and south of the Tagus, and leaving on dry territory the whole of southern Portugal. This demarcation line divides the Peninsula into two parts; north and west of it lies a soft, temperate and rainy climate, to the south and

¹Salvador de Madariaga, Spain, A Modern History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 6.

east, a hard, dry and extreme climate.² Both Spains make Spain, the temperate and the extreme; but there is little doubt that the extreme is the more important of the two.

In spite of her relative inaccessibility Spanish thinking has been conditioned by the belief that Spain has been for centuries the dueling-ground of Europe.³ In comparatively modern times the major affairs were the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), which resulted from British and Dutch resistance to Louis XIV's attempt to place his grandson on the Spanish throne; the Peninsular War (1808-1813), which was a consequence of Napoleon's fight with England; and the invasion of Spain in 1823 by the duc d'Angoulême in support of Ferdinand VII. This intervention, which was sanctioned by the conservative powers of Europe, resulted in the destruction of the recently established liberal regime. The list might be concluded with the Spanish Civil War as a duel between the Soviet Union and the Axis Powers, but most Spaniards recognize the basic inherent causes.

The Peninsular War, from the Spanish view, was the most traumatic. It virtually destroyed all the considerable progress made by Spain in the eighteenth century age of enlightenment. It left Spanish soil devastated and it ripped away the great overseas empire. Spain did not recover for generations, and the seed of isolationism was planted, which is still strong today.

²Ibid., p. 8.

³A. P. Whitaker, Spain and the Defense of the West (New York: Harper Brothers, 1961), p. 92.

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This isolationism was only partly a matter of choice. Spain, because of her weak condition, decided to leave power politics to the stronger nations, who reciprocated in their views. Spain remained outside the system of great-power alliances during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but she did enter the land scramble in her bid for Morocco, first with a treaty with France in 1904 and later by participating in the multilateral agreements at Algeciras in 1906.⁴

Several writers have pointed out that Spanish history is altogether inadequate. Spain differs in so many respects from the rest of Europe, especially in an economic, cultural and psychological sense that the usual concepts of Army, Church, feudalism, liberalism and so on have a very different meaning when applied to Spain. Throwing aside the usual clichés like "Africa begins at the Pyrenees," it is nevertheless true that Spain is the unique result of a very complex and involved melting pot, perhaps more complex than any other country of Europe. The physical characteristics of the country both accentuate and emphasize the differences. The Pyrenees to a large degree have insulated Spain from the rest of Europe, but not enough to prevent many waves of invaders from Europe and from Africa from altering her character in widely divergent patterns.

One of the strongest tendencies in Spain is that of provincialism. A man's first allegiance has always been to his town and village, to his family and social group, and only secondly to his country and

⁴Ibid., p. 23.

government. One writer expresses it, "In what one may call its normal condition Spain is a collection of small, mutually hostile or indifferent republics held together in a loose federation."⁵

This Spanish tendency toward isolation has been countered by reverse currents of imperialism and internationalism and by the concept of a world mission. Spain was a member of the League of Nations and joined the United Nations in 1955 after a long struggle. Franco adhered in 1939 to an Axis Anti-Comintern Manifesto and after World War II he actively sought association with the West in opposition to the Soviet bloc.

This dichotomy between internationalism and isolationism is pronounced. It has been observed by many writers, but no exhaustive study has been made.

Whitaker emphasizes that the isolationist trend is to a large degree a function of nationalism, which was a major factor in Franco's successful Civil War. This nationalism has overtones of regionalism. The Spanish in their internal affairs are not so much Spaniards as they are Catalonians, Andalusians, Basques, Castilians, etc. This regional nationalism and the retarding force of traditionalism, along with the lack of a middle class prevented a state-wide nationalism on the European model, such as England, France or Germany.

Strong anticlerical elements exist within the Franco regime as well as among its opponents. Franco has shown more social consciousness

⁵Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 7.

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than many of his critics. Some of these critics would remove Franco only to establish an authoritarian regime of another kind. Thus, one of Franco's major problems has been the institutionalization of his regime. Not only Franco but all of Spain are eager for a solution that will keep their nation from flying into warring fragments as happened in 1936.

Church and State

The 1936 Civil War had among its causes a polarization between the Church and the anticlericals. This was not a new phenomenon to Spain. In various outbreaks of anticlericalism during the nineteenth century the Spanish government had expropriated Church lands. But after the Restoration of 1874 the Bourbon monarchy proclaimed the indissolubility of the bond which tied it to the Church by compensating religious orders for their confiscated property. In 1931, when King Alfonso was on the point of abdicating, he did have the solid support of the Church. Their point of view then apparently swung to the conviction that if God and the Spanish people wanted a Republic again, the Church would find ways of accommodating itself to the new regime. It might in this fashion escape the rigors of Republican anticlericalism and church burning which had broken out in previous political crises.⁶

The lower clergy who had been paid a meagre subsistence from the government budget felt no loyalty toward the fallen monarchy. The

⁶F. Manuel, The Politics of Modern Spain (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1938), p. 103.

bigger problem was whether the higher clergy, many of them living in ostentatious luxury and indifferent to the plight of their flocks, would alter their position in time to escape the vengeance of the anti-clericals. The hierarchy was often less flexible than the Church itself. It was not surprising that the Church's new sympathy for social democracy was met with suspicion by the Spanish people. Anticlerical excerpts from Rousseau, Volney, and Kropotkin appeared in popular form and the workers devoured them. The year 1931 witnessed the bloodless birth of the Second Republic but after a month of "peaceful revolution" the mobs set fire to churches and drove nuns and monks out of the convents and monasteries.

The church sought shelter in a "liberal" position. It would suffer in silence a partial disestablishment, even the declaration that Catholicism was no longer the state religion, if only its properties were respected. Was it not a corporation in public law? But the Republican-Socialist coalition under Azuña was indifferent. During the 1931-1933 period it framed constitutional articles hostile to the religious orders and passed a set of supplementary laws which outraged Catholic conservatives.

The Jesuits had incurred the most hatred. A decree of January 23, 1932 dissolved the Order on the constitutional ground that its members were subservient to an alien power.⁷

The Church tried to adapt to the changing political currents. The Leftists claimed that the Church owned from thirty to ninety percent

⁷Ibid., p. 105.

of the national wealth exclusive of land. But this is difficult to substantiate.⁸ The higher clergy including the Cardinal Primate did not receive a very high wage. The latter in 1931 received very little more than the Republic paid the porters in its offices.⁹ The lower clergy, the parish priests, subsisted on a much lower figure. The Republic committed a grave tactical error in halting this paltry sum, by alienating a large group who might have otherwise sustained the Republic.

The biggest objection to the Church's policies was its resolute opposition to anything that even suggested a trace of liberalism. The Church controlled the educational system, which was its major weapon. Yet the illiteracy rate was very high; the League of Nations Yearbook of 1932 gives a figure that fifty to seventy-five percent of the peasants were illiterate.¹⁰ It is not surprising to note the appeal of oversimplified doctrines to such an electorate.

France had a great deal of mass support in the Civil War. A great part of it came from the devout peasants, particularly in the north, who believed he was fighting a crusade against the diabolical forces of Marxism.

E. Allison Peers describes the Catholic Church in Spain as the Church of the Spanish people. Whether a person believes in its dogma or not, there is no other conclusion. It is confirmed by the fact that

⁸E. Allison Peers, Spain, the Church and the Orders (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1939), pp. 199-202.

⁹Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁰Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations (Geneva, 1932), p. 47.

no other religious body can describe itself as the serious rival of the Church.¹¹ With very rare exceptions persons who have left the Church have cut themselves off from Christianity altogether, instead of transferring their allegiance elsewhere. Richard Ford in his Handbook to Spain (1845) wrote, "The whole nation is divided into two classes--bigoted Romanists or Infidels: there is no via media." Not from logic but from temperament and age-old tradition the attitude of the Spaniard toward the Church is all or nothing. There is a tendency both in religion and politics to see everything black or white. The man who no longer accepts Catholicism makes no attempt to find an intermediate position but goes straight to the other extreme and either becomes fanatically opposed to all religion, which probably explains the success of the Anarchist movement and the anti-Christian outrages, or he embraces a strictly individual form of personal religion, the extent of which is known to himself. Protestantism has had meagre success in Spain. Even the privileges offered by the Second Republic had little effect. Peers argues that Catholicism, with its emphasis on individual devotion and the reverent attitude of worship, provides a receptive atmosphere in which a people of the peculiarly individualistic and mystical Spanish temperament can best develop its spiritual life.¹²

¹¹Peers, op. cit., p. 3.

¹²Ibid., p. 8.

The Army

The industrial revolution largely by-passed Spain and the result was soon felt on the army. It could not hope to compete with European armies bristling with the latest mechanical hardware. Instead of foreign wars, the army turned its attention to the internal affairs of the country. Between the two World Wars conservative civilians never dared to challenge directly the power of the army.

The memory of the 1917 strikes was too strong, and revolutionary unrest was still rampant among the workmen. In addition, frequent anarchist uprisings in Barcelona never permitted the bourgeois to assume complete control and relegate the army to a secondary role. The ruling classes preserved the army's prestige as a sine qua non for their own continued existence.¹³ The army, for its part, aware of its indispensability became even more pretentious. Alfonso XIII considered being the first soldier in the kingdom his most prized title.

Traditionally the Spanish Crown held the right to name the Primate and other archbishops and bishops. This was true up to the time that Alfonso XIII left his throne in 1931. Even Franco, not of royal blood, claimed the right to name the clerical hierarchy and finally compromised on one plan to share this power with the Pope.¹⁴

The army of Spain believes it has an exclusive right to "pronounce" on any regime or government. By this is meant the power to

¹³ Manuel, op. cit., p. 44.

¹⁴ Charles Folts, Jr., The Masquerade in Spain (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1946), pp. 13-14.

pass judgment on the competence of a government to rule, and if necessary to overthrow that government by force.¹⁵

As a reward for their suppression of the workers the army juntas were actually granted controlling power in the state. The leading conservative politicians in the Cortes were not always docile in the face of military pretensions, but the army could not be insulted with impunity. A Law of Jurisdiction dragged before a military tribunal any civilian who made improper reflections upon the army or its personnel.¹⁶

Following the lead of Azuaga, the Republican cabinet intended to divide the Spanish people as much as possible from the only form of religion they knew. To do this in any country is a danger, and no less experienced an anticlerical as Clemenceau had given a warning to Romanones that it was a dangerous move. Clemenceau emphasized that the Government would have a large body of opinion within the State completely hostile to it, which it could no longer influence.¹⁷

Militarism in Spain is not the same phenomenon that characterized Prussian and German history. It has not been a military caste that controlled national policy, with a warlike spirit and intention. It would be better described as praetorianism.¹⁸ A body of officers, not a caste, controls the political life of the nation. Their major

¹⁵Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁶Manuel, op. cit., p. 44.

¹⁷R. Sencourt, Spain's Ordeal (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1940), p. 46.

¹⁸De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 170.

general to the point of overlooking the importance of the individual, and

the result of this is that the individual is treated as a mere means to an end, and not as an end in himself.

It is only when we recognize the individual as an end in himself that we can begin to understand the importance of the individual in the moral life.

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objective is the preservation of their power and their continued enjoyment of their privileges and prerogatives.

This phenomenon is relatively new in Spain, yet not without roots in older traditions and in the national character. Generals began to loom large on the Spanish horizon during the Napoleonic War. Civil war, with intermittent periods of peace, was the main occupation of Spaniards from 1800 to 1876. This, along with the colonial wars, provided a reason for maintaining a large military establishment, enabling many officers to ascend to the highest official positions. Men like Espartero and Serrano, who became regents of the kingdom by a combination of military dash and courage and relatively easy field successes, would never have risen beyond obscure positions in any walk of life requiring a moderate amount of intelligence.¹⁹ The army established the custom, which it turned into a necessity, of entrusting the governor-generalship of overseas territories to military men, and thus obtained many top-level posts. By active intervention in politics they often obtained the highest offices in the state.

The Civil War and World War II

The Civil War is the great overriding reality of modern Spain. Brennan makes the point that if Franco had made a wise and merciful use of his victory, he could have had the whole of war-weary Spain solidly behind him. Unfortunately, his entry into Madrid signaled a vigorous

¹⁹Ibid., p. 171.

proscription. At least a million men and women were put in prison, thousands were executed. The middle classes were largely ruined. The only people who profited were the Falangists who took all the jobs, and the food speculators who made fortunes.²⁰

Franco, in spite of the criticism heaped upon him for his domestic policies, has won even the grudging admiration of his critics for Spanish foreign policy since the Civil War. As early as September 27, 1938 Franco had declared that Spain would remain neutral in case of a European war.²¹ In matters of policy the Nationalist government found itself in unstable equilibrium; it had a debt of gratitude toward the Axis Powers yet it was fully aware of the strong geographical, political and economic ties which linked Spain to the West. The situation was reflected in the Cabinet, the foreign secretary was General Jordana who leaned to the West, while the home secretary Serrano Suñer favored the Axis Powers.

Franco's course in foreign policy was to play off Great Britain and France against Germany and Italy. He turned down an offer for a big reconstruction loan by Anglo-French-American interests in May of 1939, although Spain was paralysed by lack of capital. The refusal was undoubtedly due to political considerations.

On the other hand, a German commission was studying the possibilities of German collaboration in the economic reconstruction of the

²⁰ Brennan, op. cit., p. 332.

²¹ De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 566.

country and Italy was cooperating in joint plans with Spain for the rebuilding of roads and railroads. It seems fairly obvious that Hitler and Mussolini knew that the war was coming, and these so-called economic studies and plans must have been at least in part camouflages for military studies and preparations which might one day mature.²²

The signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact was received in Spain with obvious astonishment. When hostilities began, it was quite apparent that Franco would be more than ever able to remain neutral. Hatred against Communism remained a strong feeling, much stronger than German friendship and was shown by the attitude of the press, which was strictly controlled, during the Russo-Finnish War and by the thousands of letters received by the Finnish minister in Madrid. The Spanish Red Cross sent supplies and volunteers to the Finnish Red Cross.

When France collapsed in May of 1940 the wall behind which Spain was able to keep new friends at arm's length crashed to the ground. Yet Franco succeeded at any rate till the end of 1941 in not paying either dictator in their capitals the visits which they might and may have demanded on the score of gratitude. Franco met Hitler on October 23, 1940 at the Spanish frontier, the longest distance from Berlin Hitler ever traveled to see anyone. The visit took place after a three-day stay of Himmler in Madrid, and although both von Ribbentrop and Serrano Suñer were present, no very material results came out of the meeting.²³

²²Ibid., p. 571.

²³Ibid., p. 576.

Hitler's attack on Russia on June 22, 1941 greatly simplified Franco's diplomatic policy. The early victories gave rise to many pro-German speeches, even on the part of the usually cautious caudillo. Later in the year the situation changed abruptly, owing to Japan's entry into the war, and Germany's declaration of war against the United States. On December 19 General Franco issued a decree, declaring Spain would remain non-belligerent. There was no mention of neutrality, and this distinction seems to have been real and substantial. The tide of war rose and fell, and left Franco with his next problem, seeking a post-war accommodation with the victors.

CHAPTER II

THE STRUGGLE TO JOIN THE UNITED NATIONS

The World War II Period

There is a wide school of thought that Franco was especially pro-Axis during World War II. Although he was careful not to come out openly as a belligerent on the side of the Axis powers, he also declined the code of strict neutrality, for one of "non-belligerency." In deference to Spain's own self-interest, if for nothing else, the Caudillo had little choice in June 1940 after the fall of France but to try to accommodate Spanish policies to the real facts of a Europe dominated by Hitler's Germany.

There is ample evidence that Franco was quite willing to obtain what territorial gains for Spain as were available in the "New Order" for Europe. At Hendaye, in October of 1940, Hitler and Franco discussed a possible joint assault on Gibraltar. Yet Franco wanted more than the "Rock." He indicated Spain's aspirations in North Africa, particularly Morocco and Oran. Unfortunately for these pretensions, Germany and Italy also had designs on Morocco, and perhaps even more significant was the question of the reaction of Vichy France. If Hitler stripped away French holdings in North Africa, Petain might throw in with Great Britain, then seize Morocco. Hitler therefore thought that Franco's price was too high, and Hendaye came to no fruitful result.¹

¹United States Department of State, Documents on German Foreign

THE JOURNAL

OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

FOR THE YEAR 1908

Published by the American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill.

The Journal of the American Medical Association is published weekly, except on Sundays and public holidays, and is the official organ of the American Medical Association. It is the only medical journal published in the United States which is read by the majority of the medical profession. It is the only medical journal which is read by the majority of the medical profession.

Subscription price, \$5.00 per annum in advance. Single copies, 15 cents.

Entered as second-class matter, June 26, 1907, under post office number 373, at Chicago, Ill., under special agreement of post office and post paid.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on July 1, 1918.

Postage paid at Chicago, Ill.

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Printed by the American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Ill.

The Journal of the American Medical Association is published weekly, except on Sundays and public holidays, and is the official organ of the American Medical Association.

Subscription price, \$5.00 per annum in advance. Single copies, 15 cents.

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Carlton J. H. Hayes, who was the United States Ambassador to Spain from May 1942 to January 1945, felt reasonably certain that Franco was determined in 1940 not to enter the war. He describes him as temperamentally a very cautious man, "a typical *Gallego*." He was a political realist who had no illusions about the weakness and exhaustion of Spain from three terrible years of Civil War. Franco was also aware of the continuing and deep-seated divisions among the Spanish people and the danger to his regime in plunging into an unpopular war. He was well aware that the vast majority of the people wanted peace and not a war.²

The early period of World War II was a difficult time for Franco. He had been thwarted by Hitler in his territorial aspirations and the Hitler-Stalin pact left him in an incongruous position. The period from February 1941 to June 1941 was the coldest one between Spain and the Axis Powers until they began to lose the war. But Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in June made the rest of 1941 a jubilant year for Franco. He could carry on his anti-Communist crusade without a contradiction, and the fear of a German march through Spain to Gibraltar was lessened. Franco felt so sure of Axis victory that he threw off the pretense of neutrality and warned the United States to stay out of the war.³ He dispatched the "Blue Division" to fight against the hated

Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, V. 9: The War Years, March 18-June 22, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1956), pp. 620-621.

²Carlton J. H. Hayes, Martime Mission in Spain: 1942-1945 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), p. 65.

³Whitaker, op. cit., p. 10.

Communists on the Eastern Front with appropriate fanfare and publicity in the Spanish press.

The period from December 1941 to November 1942, which was marked by the entry of the United States into the war, saw Franco move from neutrality to "non-belligerency." But the Axis war effort was disappointing. Mussolini ran into a string of reverses and Hitler's armies bogged down in the scorched wastes of the Soviet Union. Spain occupied an exposed position on the Atlantic which was controlled by the United States and Great Britain and when the Allies made their successful landings in North Africa, Franco realized that Axis victory was not a certain conclusion. He began to concentrate on keeping friendly with both sides, while keeping Spain out of the war.

As the tide of war swung sharply in favor of the Allies, Spain turned toward rapprochement with the United States. The Foreign Minister, José Félix de Lequerica in conversations with Ambassador Hayes in 1944 emphasized the desirability of the United States and Spain drawing together. The United States, said Lequerica, was now the greatest military nation in the world and in order to play its proper role in the postwar scheme of affairs "it should realistically utilize Spain as a special bulwark in Europe."⁴ This approach was prophetic to the agreements that were ultimately signed in 1953.

Hayes relates that in his first interview with Franco, the Caudillo went to some length in explaining Spain's "non-belligerency."

⁴ Ibid., p. 19.

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He meant by the term that Spain was not neutral in the conflict against Communism, and specifically in the war between Germany and Russia, but that Spain took no sides in the conflict between the Axis on the one side and the Western Powers on the other. In short, Spain felt no hostility toward the United States.⁵ Hayes emphasized that by far the largest majority of the Spanish people favored the United States and Great Britain during the war, but that an even larger number wanted to keep out of the war at all costs.⁶ The traumatic experience of the Civil War was still too vivid to the average Spaniard.

Hayes is one who attacks the idea that Spain sent vast amounts of produce to Germany in order to aid the war against the Allies. He observed that the produce that did actually go from Spain to Germany in 1942 and 1943 was much less than exaggerated reports would indicate. These exports were made for financial considerations and in payment for imports which Spain vitally needed for its domestic economy and which the Allies, for war reasons, were unable or unwilling to furnish, items such as heavy machinery, precision tools, buses and streetcars, drugs and chemicals, and seed potatoes. Spain did not export wheat to Germany; as late as January 1944, Germany exported 20,000 tons of wheat to Spain.⁷

The situation in North Africa during the winter of 1942-1943 is a case in point. The Allied landings, though successful, were accomplished by relatively small forces and several months elapsed before

⁵ Hayes, op. cit., p. 31.

⁶ Ibid., p. 51.

⁷ Ibid., p. 84.

supplies and reinforcements were sufficient to enable an offensive against Tunisia to get underway. The exposed position of the Allies was well known to the Germans, and increased their temptation to march across Spain to cut off the Allied forces. Doubtless they would have tried to do this if they could have counted on Spain's acquiescence. But Spain, through Count Jordana, and probably through Franco himself, made it clear that if the Germans moved in, it would enter the war on the Allied side.⁸

Franco-Spanish relations were good during World War II. Vichy France and Spain had been on good terms. In fact, Marshal Pétain had been France's first ambassador to Spain after the Spanish Civil War. But after the liberation strained relations between Paris and Madrid were the rule for ten years. In fact, a small-scale cold war existed for the period 1945-1948 and the France-Spanish border remained closed for two years. France took a leading role in the UN denunciation of the Franco regime and urged even stronger measures only to be restrained by the United States and Great Britain. Spain was threatened by invasion several times during this period by a combined army of Spanish exiles and French maquis.⁹

It was only the development of the bigger cold war with the Soviet Union that tended to reduce Franco-Spanish tensions. And, in fact, there was no real relaxation until the Suez crisis of 1956.

⁸ Ibid., p. 95.

⁹ R. Gin, 'Spain in the Post-War World,' Foreign Policy Reports, August 1, 1947, p. 125.

The occasion of Ambassador Hayes leaving Madrid and being replaced by Norman Armour signaled a definite cooling in Spanish-American relations. There was a large segment of the American press which fanned public opinion against continued diplomatic relations with Spain.

President Roosevelt on March 10, 1945 sent a letter to the new American Ambassador to Madrid. He stated quite frankly that although the United States maintained diplomatic relations with Spain, it was not to be interpreted as implying approval of the regime or of its sole party, the Falange. He noted that it was not the practice of the United States to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries unless a threat to international peace existed. Yet Roosevelt emphasized that he could see no place in the community of nations for government founded on fascist principles.¹⁰

Roosevelt died shortly afterward, but this trend continued and on August 2, 1945 at Potsdam, Truman, Stalin and Attlee said that they did not favor Spain for membership in the United Nations. Thus the war-time policy which had as its object the neutrality of Spain was gradually transformed into a postwar policy that became increasingly hostile to the Franco regime.

Spain's Elimination as an Early United Nations Member

The Potsdam Declaration eliminated Spain from consideration as an early member of the United Nations. It said in part:

¹⁰ The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. VIII, No. 27, September 30, 1945, 466.

The three governments will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above. They feel bound, however, to make it clear that they would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish government, which, having been founded with support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origin, nature, record, and close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.¹¹

This text contains a double standard. For after all, what was the United Nations? Was it actually an association of States entering a period of cooperative foreign policy, or merely a Victory Club that would open its doors to neutrals provided they were acceptable to the victors? As Madariaga observes, the UN which purported to be an alliance against aggression, contained as a leading member, the Soviet Union, which had been expelled by the League of Nations for the naked aggression on Finland. The Potsdam Declaration, therefore, lacked all moral authority to condemn or exclude anyone.¹² Franco was branded an aggressor and totalitarian by Stalin, the arch-aggressor and arch-totalitarian.

The indictment of Spain before the Security Council on April 6, 1946 turned out to be a comedy, in some respects. For one thing the accuser was Poland, a puppet of the Soviet Union, more totalitarian by far than Spain. The grounds for the indictment were that "the present regime in Spain is endangering international peace." Franco asked how could he be accused of being a dictator when the Cortes had approved as

¹¹The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIII, No. 319, August 5, 1945, 155-160.

¹²De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 595.

many important laws and their proceedings were public. This was indeed true, but all the Cortes could do was "approve," it is not allowed to legislate.¹³ As for the independence of their members, on February 22, Franco had dismissed six members including the Duke of Alba for having signed a message of greeting to the pretender to the throne.

The UN Assembly on December 12, 1946 passed a resolution on Spain. It was based on a variety of motives and provided that Spain was to be debarred from representation in UN agencies and conferences, and that if the internal situation in Spain had not changed within a reasonable time the Security Council was to "consider adequate measures." In the interim, all members of the United Nations were to recall their heads of missions from Madrid.

In regard to the admission of other states into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter declares that:

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;
2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Ten Republicans were executed on February 20, 1946. This stirred up a great wave of anger and protest in the rest of the world. But it is necessary to keep the record straight. Franco's repression was indeed barbarous and cruel; but the world hardly ever heard of executions

¹³Ibid., p. 597.

unless Communists were involved. On February 2, 1946 four victims were executed in Barcelona. The next week, the United States, Great Britain and France issued a joint declaration to the effect that

. . . so long as General Franco continues in control of Spain, the Spanish people cannot anticipate full and cordial association. . .¹⁴

with the nations victorious over Hitler. The three governments expressed the hope that patriotic and liberal Spaniards might soon find the means to bring about a peaceful withdrawal of Franco. This pious declaration implied that the three nations would be more cooperative with a middle-of-the-road regime.

In 1946 the Sub-Committee on the Spanish Question of the Security Council reached the conclusion that in origin, nature, structure and general conduct, the Franco regime was a Fascist one, patterned on and largely established by the aid received from Hitler's Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Fascist Italy.¹⁵ In March 1946 the Big Three, France, England and the United States actually called for the overthrow of the Franco government.

In April 1946 a Security Council resolution was passed which referred to the unanimous moral condemnation of Franco's regime in the Security Council. In December 1946 the General Assembly passed a resolution urging member nations to withdraw their Ambassadors from Spain.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 227.

¹⁵H. L. Mathews, The Yoke and the Arrows (New York: George Braziller, 1961), p. 72.

Along with this, Spain was excluded from the affiliated agencies of the UN and from UN conferences.

The United States barred Spain from Marshall Plan aid although it was offered to the Soviet Union. These moves strengthened rather than hurt Franco's cause. Spanish pride was hurt, and Spaniards generally resented foreign attempts at interference. One writer observed that Spain is relatively impervious to criticism because the Spaniard is convinced that foreigners do not and cannot understand him.¹⁶

In any case Franco apparently thought that he was in the right. He did not change any of his policies, but the United States and the rest of the world did. Ambassadors began to return to Madrid and cordial relations were restored. In November 1960 the ban against Spanish membership in the affiliated agencies of the UN was revoked by a resolution of the General Assembly.

On July 16, 1951 Admiral Forrest Sherman, United States Chief of Naval Operations, had a conference with Franco. He brought up the subject of a possible accord whereby the United States would establish air and naval bases in Spain.

This ostracism of Spain was misplaced in some respects. It produced an effect opposite to the one intended. Instead of weakening, it strengthened Franco's hold on Spain. It tightened his hold over the groups already committed to him by making it clear that their fate was linked with his, that they would stand or fall with him. This was not

¹⁶Ibid., p. 73.

a well-knit, cohesive structure over which Franco presided, but a faction-ridden assortment of power groups. Even the Falange, which was considered abroad as the chief integrating force of a well-knit totalitarian regime, was itself split into factions that Franco had forced to unite in 1937.¹⁷

The United Nations resolution, although severe on the surface, apparently did not alarm Franco. Great Britain and the United States were not to be feared as enemies and might even come to be "realist" partners. Franco took this opportunity to move toward the Monarchy, at least to all outward appearances. He declared that a law would be enacted which would declare Spain a monarchy, but without a king while he lived. Upon Franco's death, the Council of the Realm, which was a body set up by the law, would jointly with the government propose to the Cortes the name of a prince to be king. The Cortes would have to approve the nomination by a two-thirds majority, and swear to uphold the fundamental laws. The pretender spurned this law which although monarchist in form, in substance violated all monarchist doctrine and tradition.

On June 8, 1947 the Cortes approved the law by a unanimous vote. It was followed by a referendum on July 6. The government's figures showed 12,628,983 votes for; 643,501 against, 380,871 blank or void votes.¹⁸

¹⁷Whitaker, op. cit., p. 28.

¹⁸Nadaringa, op. cit., p. 599.

The Change in American Policy Toward Spain

The events in Korea had a profound influence upon American foreign policy. Even though the government of South Korea had warned the United States that if American troops were withdrawn, the North Korean Communists would seek to unify the nation by force, the American army was withdrawn on June 29, 1949. It was exactly one year later that North Korean troops crossed the border and invaded South Korea. President Truman took quick and decisive action in resisting this aggression. Great Britain and other nations followed in an action that was endorsed by the United Nations.

This was one of Stalin's worst blunders. Up to this point the American public were content to enjoy the luxuries of the postwar economic boom and still were not alarmed over Russian intentions. The Korean aggression forced them to take a more realistic appraisal of the facts of international life and to divert more resources from consumer goods to military hardware. It became obvious that the Soviet Union was not content to achieve its objectives by peaceful means alone.¹⁹

The new policy increased the leverage of the Pentagon in its relationships with the State Department and the White House. A group of Latin-American nations presented a resolution to the UN Assembly revoking the earlier resolution of December 12, 1946, recommending withdrawal of all ambassadors from Madrid. The United States voted in favor, and the resolution was passed on November 5, 1950. And although Truman

¹⁹Ibid., p. 602.

declared that it would be a long, long time before he sent an ambassador to Spain, he did so within seven weeks.

Nevertheless five more years elapsed before Spain was admitted to the United Nations as part of the package deal by which sixteen new members were admitted at the same time. But even before this there were many signs that ostracism as a policy was weakening, especially in Latin America and the United States; Franco was quick to exploit the change. He issued a "Spanish Bill of Rights," Fuero de los Españoles, through his subservient Cortes. It was an empty gesture, for the charter has been a dead letter, but it impressed many foreigners at the time. The other move was a reorganization of the cabinet that shifted emphasis from the totalitarian Falange to the more moderate Catholic Action group headed by Alberto Martin Artejo, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs.²⁰ The Fuero de los Españoles, or Charter of the Rights of Spaniards of July 20, 1945 and the Law of Succession, of July 20, 1947 are the two most important fundamental laws of Spain. Fuero is a word connected with Spanish traditions since the middle ages and its constitutional significance and historical associations are a Spanish equivalent of the Magna Carta. The Charter of 1945 guarantees personal rights and immunities that are, in fact, trampled upon every day. One writer describes it, "The Charter of Rights is the most magnificent document ever penned. . . ."²¹

²⁰ Brennan, op. cit., p. 332.

²¹ Madariaga, op. cit., p. 566.

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The Law of Succession of 1947 is in the same tradition and has likewise proved to be a hoax, but an example of Franco's ingenuity. It committed him for the first time to the restoration of the monarchy and met the demand for institutionalizing the regime to the extent of setting up a Council of the Realm which, sitting with the cabinet, would nominate his successor, and a Council of Regency to serve in case of an interregnum. The law specifies the qualifications of the future monarch. He must be a male, a Spaniard, at least thirty years of age and must swear to uphold the fundamental laws of the land. The very vagueness of the qualifications placed Franco in a position to play off possible candidates for the throne against each other. There was no time limit set for a restoration, so Franco could go on playing this game indefinitely, as he apparently intends to do. In addition, his appointment of high church and army officials to the two councils binds these groups more closely to his regime.²²

The American policy of ostracism can be explained in terms of two kinds of pressure, one from its own citizens, the other from its allies and associates in Europe. During the Spanish Civil War public opinion in the United States was about evenly divided on the Franco issue, but a large segment of opinion never wavered in the belief that Franco was an Axis tool. His actions in World War II tended to support this view, and when the pressure of the war was eased by victory, the United States felt secure enough to demobilize and to press for a

²²Whitaker, op. cit., pp. 122-123.

liquidation of the two remaining pro-Axis regimes, Franco's in Spain, and Peron's in Argentina.

The traditional American policy of nonintervention precluded direct action but not ostracism. This policy was adopted with general public support, Communist inspiration not being necessary. This action was paralleled by strong pressure in the same direction from Europe. DeGaulle had taken a strong anti-Franco attitude from the beginning. The Labor government which came to power in Great Britain during the Potsdam Conference was more hostile than the outgoing Conservatives. In this period Washington was inclined to follow the lead of Spain's neighbors, especially Britain and France, in shaping its own Spanish policy. It had done so to a great extent during the Spanish Civil War, and to a lesser but still considerable extent during World War II.²³

Even as late as 1948 American policy toward Spain was influenced to a large degree by Britain and France. Acting Secretary of State Lovett stated that the government's attitude toward the exclusion of Spain from Marshall Plan aid was influenced by Britain and France, whose interest in Spain was much greater than the United States. It was only in 1950 after the outbreak of the Korean conflict that Washington developed an independent policy toward Spain, different from and often opposed to that of its European allies.²⁴

²³ Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), 481-82.

²⁴ Whitaker, op. cit., p. 25.

Stanton Griffis, who spent a year as American Ambassador to Spain in 1951, in fact, the first United States Ambassador after the five-year lapse, argues that the United Nations resolution rallied the Spanish people to Franco's support, that the people felt that they had been unjustly attacked by the other nations.²⁵ Griffis relates that his appointment was dictated to some extent by military considerations, a feeling that the circle of defense against the Soviet Union should be completed by including Spain. He observes that his appointment was bitterly criticized by the labor unions, by anti-Catholics, and by many who were influenced by the misleading and romantic stories published by American novelists who fought in the International Brigade in the Civil War.

²⁵Stanton Griffis, Lying in State (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1952), p. 281.

CHAPTER III

SPAIN IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Admission and Reaction

In the Tenth Session of the General Assembly on December 14, 1955, Spain along with fifteen other nations was admitted as a member of the United Nations.¹ The election of the sixteen new members ended five years of wrangling on the issue. The new members were the first admitted since Indonesia was admitted in 1950 and raised the total membership to seventy-six. The inclusion of the four Soviet satellites--Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary and Rumania--increased the size of the Soviet bloc to nine. With the admission of the twelve non-Communist Governments, every independent State in Europe was represented except Switzerland, East Germany and West Germany.

The recommendation was adopted by 55 votes to none, with two abstentions, Belgium and Mexico. Mexico's abstention was not surprising in view of its support of the Republican government in exile, but Belgium's abstention, although it had a Socialist-dominated government, angered General Franco.²

Spanish officials hailed the election as Franco's greatest foreign policy triumph since the signing of military and economic

¹United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, 10th Session, Plenary Meetings (December 14, 1955), p. 436.

²Arriba, Madrid, December 15, 1955.

THE JOURNAL

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agreements with the United States in September 1953. The government-controlled press called the action a clear vindication of the Franco regime, which the General Assembly of the United Nations had labeled a "threat to the peace" in December 1946.

Madrid was described as jubilant when it received the news that Spain had been admitted to the United Nations. The official feeling of satisfaction was felt to be a vindication of the anti-Communist and military dictatorship. Spanish officials declared that the Security Council decision not only eliminated what Madrid considered an injustice and affront but in the words of the editorial writers, proved that Spain was right all along and that it took the United Nations nine years to realize that it had been wrong in advocating an anti-Spanish policy.³

The Spanish newspapers did not emphasize that the mass admission of new members also "vindicated" the Communist regimes of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. It was not explained to the Spanish public that the package deal was generally interpreted as a step toward universalizing the membership of the United Nations and a retreat from insistence upon the principles enumerated in the Charter.⁴ José Félix Lequerica, former Ambassador to the United States, was named permanent Spanish delegate to the United Nations.

The friendlier United States attitude toward Spain was evident in a speech delivered by the American Ambassador to Spain, John Davis

³ New York Times, December 16, 1955, p. 5.

⁴ Hispanic American Report, VIII, No. 12 (December, 1955), 545-546.

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Lodge, before the Connecticut Editorial Association on December 11, 1955. Lodge reported that the military bases "are coming along well" and that "the Spanish armed forces are justifying our high expectations."⁵

In addition to the military and economic agreements of 1953 with the United States, Lodge described Spain's foreign policy as developing along three main lines. First, the Iberian defensive pact with Portugal, which provides for joint military and political consultation, and action, if necessary. Second, the fostering of cultural ties with her "sister republics" in Central and South America. Third, the implementation of a policy of rapprochement with the Moslem countries, using as a bridge her favorable relationships with the Moroccan peoples of North Africa.

Ambassador Lodge devoted much of his speech to the cultural and religious traits of the Spanish people. He declared that these "have been misunderstood and misrepresented in our country many times over." He was pleased to note the Spaniard's intense sense of personal honor and pride. These characteristics, he declared, are reflected in the Spanish Government's dealings with other nations.

The Ambassador conceded the fact that some aspects of Spanish Government are intolerable to many Americans. But he observed:

A great many of the world's governments with which we enjoy friendly and mutually beneficial relations are certainly not popular governments as we Americans understand that term. Indeed, I have always regarded the toleration and acceptance of differing, or if you will, dissident views as to government or religion, as a basic tenet of international relations.⁶

⁵New York Times, December 11, 1955, p. 7.

⁶Ibid.

Jesús de Galíndez raised the question whether Spain's admission to the United Nations was juridically valid. Writing in Iberica in February 1956 Galíndez argued that before the Government of General Franco could be admitted to the United Nations "the resolutions of London and San Francisco would have to be revoked, and the latter resolution was constituent."⁷

When the United Nations was constituted as a permanent organization in 1945 at the San Francisco Conference, Mr. Quintanilla, the Mexican delegate, made a proposal that Article 4 of the Charter (relative to the admission of new members) cannot apply to States whose regimes have been installed with the help of armed forces of countries which have fought against the United Nations so long as these regimes are in power. This proposal was approved and the prohibition specifically affected the then existent Manchukuo and Franco Spain.

Galíndez argued that in admitting Spain to the United Nations no one recalled the Preamble to the Charter, in which the constituent principles of the international organization are proclaimed:

We the peoples of the United Nations, determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person . . . to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom . . .

Galíndez pointed out that the supporters of the new formula of universality achieved a revolution in which they by-passed the constitu-

⁷Jesús de Galíndez, "Is Franco's Admission to the U.N. Juridically Valid?" Iberica, Vol. IV, No. 2 (February 15, 1956), 8.

⁸Ibid., p. 9.

tive Charter of the United Nations. He declared that in the concrete case of Spain they ignored express condemnations which continue in force, and that the constituent resolution of San Francisco had been by-passed.

Yet in looking at the arguments on both sides, it seems apparent that the United Nations had no choice but to go to the concept of "universality," if it was to represent the majority of the world's governments. Spain is certainly not alone in not having a democratic government. Limiting the United Nations to a democratic closed club would eliminate a large part of the actual existing world. And what of the Soviet Union itself, which has been a Charter Member of the United Nations?

Early Spanish Policy

José Sebastián de Brice, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Observer to the United Nations from Spain, made the first speech for his country in the General Assembly on December 20, 1955. In that it gives an advance indication of Spain's aims and policy in the United Nations, it is quoted in its entirety:

It is with deep emotion that I come to this rostrum today, an emotion which is all the greater in that this opportunity was unexpected. I did not think that I should receive the high honor of appearing before you on behalf of my country in the concluding hours of this session. That is why I have prepared no speech, no authoritative statement on Spain's future policy and direction; such a statement will be made before the Assembly, officially and at the right time, in the name of Spain.

In appearing before you, I bring only my feelings, as a Spaniard, deep and sincere feelings, with all the defects and some of the virtues of my country. I wish to thank all

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of you for your support of Spain's admission to the United Nations, and for the friendship and affection which you have shown to me. Since all the new Members have been coming to this rostrum, I also presume to appear before you and say, as the representative of a country related by ties of brotherhood to the countries of America, how gratified and proud I have been to see the efficiency, the zeal and the intelligence with which the President of this Assembly has discharged his duties.

In paying tribute to the President, I pay a tribute to all our brothers on this great and dynamic continent. On joining the United Nations, since this is, as it were, our first official appearance before you, I wish to pay a tribute to the Organization as a whole, which is doing so much for peace, and, in the person of the Secretary-General, to the Secretariat, for their efforts in pursuance of that noble aim.

It is our determination to contribute to the work of the United Nations in all its aspects; that determination reflects my country's desire for the universality of the Organization. May God protect all the countries represented here and all the representatives, brothers and friends, who have supported the cause of my country, Spain.⁹

Martin Artajo spoke in the General Assembly on November 13, 1956 on the second day of the Eleventh Session, and outlined Spain's position at considerable length. Artajo declared that the admission of Spain to the United Nations was no more than an act of justice. By virtue of its juridical character, a society of nations must be universal and it is an innate right of States to belong to it, provided that they are sovereign and independent and join the Organization with the purpose of serving its peaceful ends.¹⁰

Artajo emphasized that the United Nations had never before wielded so much authority, strengthened as it was by the admission of nineteen

⁹General Assembly, Official Records, 10th Session (September 20, 1955), p. 507.

¹⁰General Assembly, Official Records, 11th Session (November 13, 1956), pp. 15-16.

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new Members. And even more important, never before were its authority and prestige so much needed, in the face of the grave perils threatening world peace. The Spanish representative noted that the United Nations marked a great advance in the history of international relations. In the modern world the old diplomatic methods for the pacific settlement of disputes are not enough. Traditional diplomacy still has a role to play in helping to settle disputes, but the United Nations system of multilateral discussion in which all States exercise the right to give their views on common problems and in which, because the negotiations are open, public opinion plays a direct part in the argument. Thus, the United Nations method, with all its influence and authority, had proved itself better fitted to the needs of the time.

Spain's position was that one stage in the history of international relations had been brought to a close, a stage marked by exclusive oligarchic world leadership, attended on the one hand by all the advantages deriving from the wisdom and experience of the great nations, but also on the other, by a tendency to devote too much attention to the defense of established interests, without due regard for the new social realities and sometimes even in defiance of the public conscience in the newer countries. The Spanish considered that the new age will be more just, provided that it steers its course at an equal distance from the two reefs of excessive individualism, which would plunge the world into impotent anarchy, and the hegemony of the most powerful, which by exercising privileges to the destruction of the essential equality of nations, would enthrone in the Organization the ancient tyranny of might.

The weakness of the United Nations as a legally-organized international community has been and still is its lack of any effective means of enforcing its decisions. Nevertheless, the weight of its high moral authority must be a much more creditable factor in the cause of peace than the use of force by the mighty. The Spanish delegate observed that peoples perish not through weakness but through wickedness, and that the same may be said of the community of nations; its ruin is more likely to be caused by some deviation from its high purposes than by its internal weakness, "The day on which the United Nations--may God forbid--placed its authority and strength in the service of an unjust cause would mark the beginning of the end."¹¹ This emphasis upon the moral aspects of United Nations activities is characteristic of the Spanish outlook, based upon her Catholic and philosophical traditions. In an apparent reference to the plight of Hungary, Artajo noted that an unjust cause can be served by omission, as for example if the United Nations were to cease to safeguard the rights of the weak, for sins of omission, which often go unrewarded, are the most deadly from the point of view of society. To leave a people to die, just as to leave a man to die, is a hypocrite's way of killing; the hands are clean but the conscience is stained.

In the United Nations, the most powerful nations had the greatest obligation towards the work of safeguarding peace with justice. It would be a disgrace, from which the UN's prestige would never recover, if those nations applied to disputes in which they are parties procedures

¹¹ Ibid.

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and criteria different from those they apply in judging the disputes of others.

Artajo noted that Spain had never shirked participation in international undertakings. Now that it was called upon to actively cooperate with the United Nations, it responded with the greatest enthusiasm in the belief that its contribution would be of value to all. Spain would always respond promptly and boldly to a United Nations appeal on behalf of any just cause. He quoted what one of the Spanish-American delegations said in the First Committee six years prior, "The history of the world could not have been written without Spain."¹² The name of Spain was linked to the most noble of man's achievements, first among them being the discovery of the New World, which now contained the headquarters of all the nations.

In outlining the Spanish position Artajo declared that Spain would be faithful to its traditional legal principles which led it at the very beginning of modern times not only to formulate in the work of Vitoria the fundamental principles of international law but also to set forth in the writings of Suarez the essential doctrine of the community of nations.

The Spanish delegate noted that the American continent had been a decisive participant in the contemporary efforts to give life and form to the juridical community of nations. First in the League of Nations and subsequently in the United Nations, its inspiration was evident

¹² Ibid., quote taken from Mr. Artajo's speech before the General Assembly on November 13, 1956.

and its support decisive. Spain, which was so closely linked with the peoples of America, found in this a further reason to join resolutely in the common endeavor to foster international cooperation. She was ready to add her wealth of tradition to the common heritage of human values dedicated to the growth of concord and understanding among nations.

Spain's Reaction to the Hungary Crisis of 1956

Spain was outraged when the short-lived Hungarian revolution of 1956 was repressed with the aid of Soviet tanks and troops. She called for active intervention and offered to supply Spanish troops for this purpose. The Spanish government leaders recalled their own Civil War experiences fighting against the Soviets, and urged effective measures to prevent the Hungarian rebellion from being promptly crushed by Soviet power.

At the Second Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on November 4, 1956 José Félix de Lequerica, the permanent Spanish representative to the United Nations, vigorously attacked the statement of A. A. Sobolev of the Soviet Union. Lequerica described the Soviet statement about the Hungarian situation as the "usual claptrap about reactionaries, fascists, enemies of the people and so on."¹³ He observed that the Hungarian bid for freedom had been violently crushed by

¹³United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Second Emergency Special Session (November 4, 1956), Plenary Meetings, p. 11.

Soviet troops and only a puppet government remained. He demanded action by the United Nations to deliver the Hungarian people, and protested against the violent military intervention in a free European country that was being subjected to tremendous persecution and bloody sacrifice.

Lequerica referred to his own country's experience with the government that was engaged in the cruel repression of Hungary. He related that he had seen 8,000 priests, thirteen bishops and hundreds of thousands of other prisoners die by the same hands. The Spanish delegate urged whole-hearted support of the United States draft resolution which called for Soviet withdrawal from Hungary. Lequerica even ventured the opinion that perhaps the United States draft resolution did not go far enough. He suggested that the other countries might consider sending United Nations armed forces to Hungary to separate the fighting forces from each other and the invaders from the invaded.¹⁴

Four days later Lequerica suggested that the United Nations proceed as it did on the Suez question and establish a police force, a patrol force which would restore order and establish peace between the resisting Hungarian people and the invading Soviet troops. He offered for this purpose as many Spanish units as would be required, within his country's capability.¹⁵

The Spanish delegate also offered to make supplies available to the Hungarian people in accordance with Resolution 1004 (ES-II).

¹⁴Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁵General Assembly Official Records, Second Emergency Special Session (November 3, 1956), p. 35.

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Lequerica drew a parallel between the Hungarian situation and the Suez question where the large Powers agreed to the sending of an international force to re-establish order, separate the parties to the dispute, and restore independence to a people whose country had been invaded.

Lequerica sounded a warning about the argument that the more independence the Hungarian people had, the better they would be able to solve their problems. He pointed out that independence after invasion by a huge foreign army, with that army entrenched on the nation's borders, poised and ready to strike again, cannot be called true independence. It is preparation for another massacre as soon as the Hungarian people give the first sign of desiring freedom and independence and of maintaining their own national identity.¹⁶

Martin Artajo, speaking for Spain at the General Assembly on November 19, warned the Assembly of its responsibilities. He was greatly alarmed to see the United Nations as an almost passive observer during the agony of the Hungarian people. Artajo pointed out that the last centers of resistance had been wiped out and that mass deportations of Hungarian youth were now taking place.¹⁷

He emphasized Spain's strong obligation to plead Hungary's cause, alluding to the fact that Spain was one of the few nations that had never recognized the puppet governments set up by the Soviet Union in Europe and in Asia. Artajo recalled that he had lived through the 1957

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁷ General Assembly Official Records, 11th Session, Plenary Meetings (November 19, 1956), p. 127.

terror in Madrid and had seen the huge portraits of Stalin suspended on all the public buildings. He spoke of all his lost relatives and friends, not only those who fell at the front, but those executed by the Soviet secret police around the capital.¹³

Artajo observed that world public opinion overwhelmingly supported the Hungarian people and he paid high praise to the President of the United States, who had called for Russian withdrawal from Hungary. In the Spanish view, which reflects her Catholic heritage, communism is an intrinsically corrupt doctrine, which can only produce evil and unhappy results. Once God has been banished from the world, all moral standards are destroyed at their foundations. The fundamental right of every people to freedom and independence is denied and the good of the State or the will of the powerful become law. Promises are broken, treaties are violated, the most lawful freedoms are denied both to individuals and to society; and finally, international relations become impossible and the way is prepared for war.

Artajo observed that in the exercise of its powers under the Charter, the Assembly three times requested the Soviet Union to withdraw its occupation forces from Hungary. There was no answer, or rather the answer was that, instead of withdrawing its troops, the Soviet Union was deporting the Hungarians from their own country. To compound matters the Soviet Union refused to grant permission to observers to enter the country. Even humanitarian assistance to the victims was rejected unless it was sent through channels specified by the Soviet Union.

¹³ Ibid.

The Spanish delegate urged help for the Hungarians. Not merely with protests of sympathy, medicine and food, but with effective demonstrations, and sincere, daring and urgent measures. Artajo pointed out that it is not always good to delay the inevitable. In many cases weakness, delay, temporizing and complacency bring far greater evils than those they seek to avoid. On the other hand, firmness and decision on the part of the strong, in the service of justice, has often averted war. The certainty of punishment stays the hand of the criminal, while the assurance of leniency is an incentive to crime.¹⁹

On the draft resolutions introduced during this period, Spain voted in favor of the draft resolution submitted by Ceylon, Indonesia, and India,²⁰ which asked the Government of Hungary to permit observers designated by the Secretary-General to enter the territory of Hungary, to travel freely therein, and to report their findings to the Secretary-General.

Spain also voted in favor of the Cuban draft resolution,²¹ which called on the Government of the Soviet Union and the Hungarian authorities to return the Hungarian prisoners deported to Siberia.

Lequerica spoke in the General Assembly on December 4, and strongly backed the fourteen Power draft resolution on Hungary, with all its consequences.²² The main operative paragraph asked the Soviet

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 130.

²⁰ See UN document A/3368 of 21 November 1956.

²¹ See UN document A/3357 of 15 November 1956.

²² General Assembly, Official Records (December 4, 1956), p. 344.

The first of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex system, and the complexity is not only in the number of components, but also in the way they are connected. The second is the fact that the system is not a static one. It is a dynamic system, and the dynamics are not only in the way the components change, but also in the way they interact with each other. The third is the fact that the system is not a linear one. It is a non-linear system, and the non-linearity is not only in the way the components behave, but also in the way they interact with each other. The fourth is the fact that the system is not a deterministic one. It is a stochastic system, and the stochasticity is not only in the way the components behave, but also in the way they interact with each other. The fifth is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex system, and the complexity is not only in the number of components, but also in the way they are connected. The sixth is the fact that the system is not a static one. It is a dynamic system, and the dynamics are not only in the way the components change, but also in the way they interact with each other. The seventh is the fact that the system is not a linear one. It is a non-linear system, and the non-linearity is not only in the way the components behave, but also in the way they interact with each other. The eighth is the fact that the system is not a deterministic one. It is a stochastic system, and the stochasticity is not only in the way the components behave, but also in the way they interact with each other. The ninth is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex system, and the complexity is not only in the number of components, but also in the way they are connected. The tenth is the fact that the system is not a static one. It is a dynamic system, and the dynamics are not only in the way the components change, but also in the way they interact with each other. The eleventh is the fact that the system is not a linear one. It is a non-linear system, and the non-linearity is not only in the way the components behave, but also in the way they interact with each other. The twelfth is the fact that the system is not a deterministic one. It is a stochastic system, and the stochasticity is not only in the way the components behave, but also in the way they interact with each other. The thirteenth is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex system, and the complexity is not only in the number of components, but also in the way they are connected. The fourteenth is the fact that the system is not a static one. It is a dynamic system, and the dynamics are not only in the way the components change, but also in the way they interact with each other. The fifteenth is the fact that the system is not a linear one. It is a non-linear system, and the non-linearity is not only in the way the components behave, but also in the way they interact with each other. The sixteenth is the fact that the system is not a deterministic one. It is a stochastic system, and the stochasticity is not only in the way the components behave, but also in the way they interact with each other. The seventeenth is the fact that the system is not a simple one. It is a complex system, and the complexity is not only in the number of components, but also in the way they are connected. The eighteenth is the fact that the system is not a static one. It is a dynamic system, and the dynamics are not only in the way the components change, but also in the way they interact with each other. The nineteenth is the fact that the system is not a linear one. It is a non-linear system, and the non-linearity is not only in the way the components behave, but also in the way they interact with each other. The twentieth is the fact that the system is not a deterministic one. It is a stochastic system, and the stochasticity is not only in the way the components behave, but also in the way they interact with each other.

Union and Hungary to permit United Nations observers to go to Hungary to make an observation on the spot.

Lequerica spoke again on the 10th, this time in favor of the seventeen-Power draft resolution. He referred to the Warsaw Pact and described it as a diktat addressed to a group of more or less shadowy States and binding them to respect the authority of the most powerful, which had taken military precautions beforehand. He adverted to the speech of the Peruvian delegate and applauded its legal argument.

The Warsaw Treaty did not authorize the intervention of Soviet troops in Hungary, for it was established solely to cover cases of foreign invasion, to provide for defense against any invasion from abroad; and this did not happen in Hungary.²³

The Spanish representative noted that the peace treaties directed that all troops, including Soviet troops, should be withdrawn on the termination of the occupation of Austria. Hence there was no justification for this flagrant violation of these treaties. Lequerica observed that in earlier times only isolated voices were raised when outrages were committed, but turning to the contemporary world he found universal recognition of serious offenses. The whole world was denouncing the Soviet action in Hungary, as were the Spaniards, but Spain did it without hostility or rancor, but in an effort to find a remedy for the grave damage.²⁴

²³United Nations Official Records (December 10, 1956), p. 613.

²⁴Ibid., p. 614.

The first of these is the fact that the system is not a simple one, but a complex one, in which the various parts are interrelated and interdependent. The second is the fact that the system is not a static one, but a dynamic one, in which the various parts are constantly changing and evolving. The third is the fact that the system is not a closed one, but an open one, in which the various parts are constantly interacting with the environment. The fourth is the fact that the system is not a linear one, but a non-linear one, in which the various parts are constantly interacting with each other in a non-linear fashion. The fifth is the fact that the system is not a deterministic one, but a probabilistic one, in which the various parts are constantly interacting with each other in a probabilistic fashion. The sixth is the fact that the system is not a simple one, but a complex one, in which the various parts are interrelated and interdependent. The seventh is the fact that the system is not a static one, but a dynamic one, in which the various parts are constantly changing and evolving. The eighth is the fact that the system is not a closed one, but an open one, in which the various parts are constantly interacting with the environment. The ninth is the fact that the system is not a linear one, but a non-linear one, in which the various parts are constantly interacting with each other in a non-linear fashion. The tenth is the fact that the system is not a deterministic one, but a probabilistic one, in which the various parts are constantly interacting with each other in a probabilistic fashion.

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The fourth is the fact that the system is not a linear one, but a non-linear one, in which the various parts are constantly interacting with each other in a non-linear fashion.

Lequerica called on the Soviet Union to mend its ways. He observed that in the hour of truth forced allies are usually of little value and all the battles of Leipzig show how far their valor goes when the overthrow of foreign masters is at stake.

Spain was a co-sponsor of the twenty-Power resolution which was adopted on December 12, 1956.²⁵ This resolution among other things reiterated the call of the General Assembly upon the Government of the Soviet Union to desist forthwith from any form of intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary. It called upon the Government of the Soviet Union to make immediate arrangements for the withdrawal, under United Nations observation, of its armed forces from Hungary and to permit the re-establishment of the political independence of Hungary. It also requested the Secretary-General to take any initiative he deemed helpful in relation to the Hungarian problem in conformity with the principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the General Assembly.²⁶

On September 12, 1957 at the United Nations General Assembly, Lequerica supported the thirty-seven Power draft resolution on Hungary with great enthusiasm. He noted that Spain was the first nation to approach the Secretary-General to protest against the events in Hungary as soon as the news came in. Lequerica referred to Spain's experience from 1936 to 1939 in fighting Soviet techniques as a factor in her

²⁵General Assembly Official Records, 11th Session (December 12, 1956). Also see A/3436, Rev. 2, of 12 December, pp. 674-675.

²⁶General Assembly Official Records, Agenda Item 67, A/3436, Rev. 2, of December 12, 1956.

recognition of the measures being imposed on Hungary. He called it a clear-cut case of political intervention.²⁷

Lequerica noted that during the nine years of slavery, the Hungarians had never, except under duress, accepted a position of subjugation to a foreign country of which they had no very happy memories. As soon as they thought that the country which controlled them was evolving and possibly moving towards a greater degree of freedom, they threw themselves naively and ingenuously, but also with that great enthusiasm and fervor of which their history affords other examples, into the struggle to regain their freedom.

Lequerica pointed out that the fiction of so-called Hungarian parties subservient to the Soviet ideology has been the undoing of the Soviet rulers, for such parties neither existed then nor did they exist in the present. Even those who share their political ideas will form distinctively Hungarian parties. He recalled Russian history and thought of the journeys that Potemkin used to arrange for Catherine the Great. He had elaborate townships built of plaster and cloth, in which peasants dressed in their Sunday best danced and simulated contentment. Lequerica asked whether the powerful successors to Catherine were also making the acquaintance of the unreal parties which fade out at the first opportunity and whose leaders either change their views like Mr. Nagy, or ask for Soviet tanks to maintain themselves. The Soviet tanks coming to the rescue were in the tradition of Russian policy; in the time of Czar

²⁷General Assembly, Official Records (September 12, 1957), p. 1308.

Nicholas I, in 1849, he also entered Hungary with a show of force to impose foreign rule on the country.²³

The Spanish representative turned up his argument by saying that the only problem of the day was the Soviet invasion, and it was against this that he was protesting. Izquierdo referred to the words of the representative of the United Kingdom, that the Soviet delegation should not be deceived by the deliberately moderate language of the report of the Special Committee into thinking that the Assembly's indignation and determination were exhausted. Spain echoed the warning, and concluded by supporting the nomination of Prince Wen Waitheyason, the President of the General Assembly, as the person to approach Hungary with a view to working out a solution.

Unfortunately the resolution had no effect in liberating the Hungarians. The Soviet Union insisted that the rebellion was a domestic concern of Hungary, and that the rising had been controlled. In the absence of any determination of the leading members of the United Nations (specifically, the United States) to go to war to force a settlement, the Hungarian revolution was a lost cause.

The Suez Crisis of 1956

Spain was one of the signatories of the Convention of Constantinople in 1864. As such she had an historical as well as a legal interest in the controversy that developed over Egyptian nationalisation

²³ Ibid., p. 1400.

of the Suez Canal Company in 1956. She had a commercial interest in the Canal also, as a large sector of her foreign trade used the Canal route.

Yet Spain was torn between conflicting policy aims. She aspired to a leading role in North Africa. According to Herbert Matthews, Spain was hoping to play a mediatory role in the Suez Canal dispute. She felt herself to be essentially a European power, but one that had closer and more friendly relations with North Africa than any other European power.²⁹

If any nation could make a bridge between Europe and Africa, Spain felt that she was the one to do it. The first reaction on the Suez Canal incident came through the Spanish press, which is completely under the direction of the Government. Nothing appears in the Spanish newspapers on an issue of this type without the editors first consulting the Ministry of Information.

The Madrid daily Arriba was enthusiastic on July 29 about Egypt's expropriation of the Canal. It also applauded the fact that Colonel Nasser was able to obtain arms from the Soviet bloc to strengthen his country against Israel. Arriba declared that Nasser paid for the arms with cotton and this alarmed cotton producers. The newspaper pointed out that the High Dam at Aswan would increase Egyptian cotton production. It argued that the Western powers, by withdrawing their offer of financial aid to the project, felt that a masterful stroke had been made, in

²⁹ New York Times, August 5, 1956, p. 3.

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protecting their own cotton interests.³⁰ Ya, a Catholic daily newspaper, declared that Egypt would have the backing of all the nations of the "Hispano-American 'bloc'" as well as of the Arab countries if the Suez question came up before the United Nations. These sentiments reflected the official Spanish policy of close and friendly relations with the Arab countries.³¹

This reaction of the Spanish press, gloating over the discomfiture of Great Britain and France and applauding the action of President Nasser, caused considerable irritation and frustration abroad. But Spain was invariably eager to emphasize her friendship for the North African and Arab peoples. This was a good time to do so. It did not mean that in a conflict that deeply concerned Spain as a maritime power and as a European nation that the Franco Government would or could approve of an action such as the one taken by President Nasser.

The invitation to Spain to take part in the international conference on the Suez Canal starting August 16 was expected and welcomed. There had not been many opportunities for the Franco Government to take part in international meetings because of the previous policy of ostracism. The fact that Spain was now to be a part of an international conference in which she believed that her services could be of value was naturally gratifying.

Foreign Minister Artaño flew to London on August 14 with the hope of playing a constructive role in the Suez Canal conference. It

³⁰ Arriba, July 29, 1956.

³¹ Hispanic American Report, IX (July 1956), 121.

was an important moment for Spain, since it was the first international conference of this type attended by representatives of the Franco Government. It symbolized another step away from the isolationism enforced in the postwar years by the anti-Franco policies of the great powers.

The Spanish press was giving a false impression of the Government's attitude toward the seizure of the Suez Canal Company by President Nasser. The Madrid newspapers were strikingly uniform in their applause for President Nasser and their hostility toward Great Britain and France. But this was not the role that Mr. Artajo intended to play.³⁰

The Spanish position supported a compromise that would confirm the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company but guarantee the internationalization of the Canal itself. The nine-power Constantinople Convention of 1908 made a distinction between the company as a business enterprise and the canal as an international waterway. The Spanish felt that in the 1908 treaty, which provides that the canal must be open to the ships of all nations in war or peace, there is a good legal basis for making this distinction and they hoped President Nasser could be induced to accept it.

There was little doubt that Franco Spain entered her first international political conference as a Western European power whose interests were primarily European. The Franco Government, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Artajo had done a great deal to cultivate the friendship of North Africans and Arabs, and there was every desire to keep that friendship. Spain felt that this friendship could be useful

³⁰ New York Times, August 15, 1956, p. 3.

at the London conference. At the same time, if Spain had to choose, she would choose Europe, since she was dependant on the use of the Canal and she believed that she could not face the future with security unless the Canal were internationalized. In addition, there was no tendency for Spaniards to excuse President Nasser's methods or to deny the dangers that would arise if actions of this type could take place with impunity.

Spain imports about \$100,000,000 worth of petroleum each year, most of which comes from the Middle East. She also ships rice to Japan through the Suez Canal.³³

On August 22, Spain joined with seventeen other nations in support of the Dulles Plan for the Suez Canal. The plan explicitly recognized Egyptian sovereignty in the Canal area, a position which the Spanish delegate vigorously supported. This very attendance of Spain at the London Conference was a milestone in Spanish history. It marked a turning point in the policy of ostracism toward Spain by the United Nations that had originated in 1946.³⁴ The Spanish position was that Spain's economic and military security were endangered if the Canal were not internationalized. The problem remained that the Arab nations might be alienated with the resulting future threat to the outposts of Ceuta, Melilla, Ifni and Rio de Oro.

Martin Artajo took part in the London Conference and maintained an independent position because he was convinced that the object of some

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Hispanic American Report, IX (July 1956), 324.

of the Canal-user nations, to submit the Canal entirely to a purely international control would disregard Egypt's national sovereignty and imply discrimination which an independent State could hardly accept.

In order to safeguard both the sovereignty of Egypt and the rights of the users, the Spanish government felt that the Canal management should be in the hands of an Egyptian body, the membership of which would include an adequate proportion of the user nations. Spain believed that there should be an arrangement for submitting disputes between the owner and the users to an arbitration commission, from whose decision an appeal might be made to the United Nations.

Artajo summed up Spain's position on the Canal in these terms: the management of the Canal should be entrusted to an Egyptian body, compliance with the regulations to be established would be ensured by a procedure for recourse to a permanent arbitration commission with headquarters in Egypt itself, which would deal with infringements of the regulations and clear up any doubts concerning their interpretation; the whole system should be placed under the United Nations as the ultimate guarantee of its effective operation.³⁵

The Suez Canal situation continued to preoccupy the Spanish. The Banco Central in its December issue noted that Europe was the area most seriously affected by its closing, that its traffic to a very high percentage, was for and by countries located on the continent. The Banco Central was concerned with the supply of oil products from the

³⁵General Assembly, Official Records, 11 Session (November 21, 1956), p. 202.

Middle East countries, which have no other exit but shipment from the Persian Gulf ports and transport through pipelines, over the Arab countries on the Mediterranean. As the pipeline service had been interrupted by sabotage, the conflict was worsened by the blocking of the Canal, which was made unusable for several months.

The Spanish view was that the Canal be internationalized, without any restriction. If in the private sphere the property right of the individual is limited and reduced sometimes on behalf of the higher right of public advantage, which is materialized in compulsory expropriation of jus utendi which is separated from jus domini, likewise in the international field rights of way could be established in the interests of humanity.³⁶

The Suez crisis had a great effect upon relations between France and Spain. Tensions between the two countries had subsided to a degree as the cold war with the Soviet Union developed, but there was no real thaw until after the crisis over Suez. Spain formulated a new policy which substituted European cooperation for the previous pro-Arab alignment. Martin Artajo started the movement toward improved Franco-Spanish relations right after the London conference on Suez in August 1956. But Artajo had been too closely identified with the pro-Arab and anti-French policy. He was replaced by Fernando Maria de Castiella in early 1957.³⁷ Castiella was one of the leading Spanish advocates of "Europeanism."

³⁶ Boletín Informativo Departamento Extranjero del Banco Central, Madrid, Núm. 93, Diciembre, 1956, p. 2.

³⁷ Whitaker, p. 302.

the most important of the facts which are to be taken into account in the study of the history of the world is the fact that the world is a unity. The world is a unity in the sense that it is a single system of things, and that the things of the world are all connected together in a single system of relations. The world is a unity in the sense that it is a single system of things, and that the things of the world are all connected together in a single system of relations.

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In December of 1957, Spain's Permanent Delegate to the United Nations, José Félix de Lequerica, showed himself to be one of the most determined and effective supporters of French policy in the debate on Algeria. In February of 1958, a French parliamentary group, representing all major parties except the Socialists and Communists, paid a visit to Spain. It was the first such visit in a quarter of a century.³⁸

The French government began curbing the activities of the Spanish exiles in France, in deference to Franco's wishes, in return for Spain's support in the United Nations on the Algerian question. One journal reported that no Socialist or democratic organization of exiled Spaniards could hold meetings or conferences south of the river Loire, and as a consequence, two such meetings, originally planned for Toulouse had to be moved to Paris and Vierzon respectively.³⁹

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Whitaker, op. cit., p. 305.

CHAPTER IV

MOROCCO AND OTHER ISSUES

The Path of Moroccan Independence

General Franco made a dramatic shift in policy toward Morocco after Spain became a Member of the United Nations. World opinion exerted through the international organization was undoubtedly a factor, along with the well-nigh irresistible tide of nationalism sweeping through Africa. The French unilateral action in their sector of Morocco tended to force Spain's hand on the issue.

It was nevertheless true that Spain made a complete shift in her policy when she first granted self-rule to the people of the Spanish zone of Morocco and then granted independence outright. As late as December 16, 1955 Camille Cienfarras reported a Franco speech in which the Caudillo declared emphatically that he would not permit the establishment of a Western democratic system of government in the Spanish zone of Morocco. Franco played the role of the paternal guardian when he said:

Precisely because we know and love the Moroccan people we are in a better position also to realize how disastrous it would be for their future and the attainment and preservation of their independence if the trickery and internal strife of political parties after the European model were transplanted to that territory. If one wished to destroy that people I could not imagine a more cunning way of doing it.¹

¹New York Times, December 16, 1955, p. 1.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20250

TO: DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

FROM: SAC, [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible]

DATE: [illegible]

RE: [illegible]

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Francisco made clear that the Moroccans would not be granted self-rule until he felt that they were ready. He did not explain how long he expected that this would take. Francisco argued that a multi-party system would lead to internal dissension and anarchy, and as a result peace, unity, authority and even the Crown (of the Sultan) would last only a short time.

But on December 19, Spain promised the Moroccan people that they would immediately have a greater voice in the management of internal affairs. General Rafael Garcia Valino, High Commissioner for Spanish Morocco, in an interview with a correspondent of El Dia, an Arab language newspaper published in Tetuan, clarified to some extent Spain's aims and future policies in the territory. He did not discuss the form of government nor whether Madrid was prepared to recognize the first representative government formed earlier in the month in Rabat, capital of the French territory.

The High Commissioner declared that he would do all in his power to increase the responsibilities of ministers of the native government (in the Spanish zone) and intensify the transfer of administrative powers to Moroccans.²

Martin Artajo, the Foreign Minister, in a New Year's message, discussed Spanish accomplishments in foreign policy. He promised the Moroccan nationalists who sought complete independence that "Spain will not lag" in studying the problem of self-rule.³

²New York Times, December 20, 1955, p. 12.

³New York Times, January 1, 1956, p. 3.

By March 13 Franco promised independence and unity to Morocco. The Sultan arrived in Madrid on April 4 to claim formal recognition of his Empire.

Franco himself met Mohammed V at Barajas airport, gave His Imperial Majesty a hearty abrazo, and escorted him off to the capital between rows of cheering Spaniards. At El Pardo palace, Franco decorated the Sultan with the Order of the Yoke and Arrows, a high award displaying the Falangist insignia. Later, in the Goya room of the official residence, Franco announced his willingness to renounce control of Spanish Morocco.⁴

The French decision to abrogate unilaterally the 1912 Treaty of Fez and to negotiate with the Sultan on the basis of sovereign equality had clearly forced Franco's hand. It was true in a larger sense that he was reaping the fruits of his own encouragement of Moroccan nationalism. French concessions to nationalist demands in Morocco necessitated a like response on Franco's part if he wished to continue to play the role of a friend of the Islamic world. In addition, the proposed withdrawal of the French army suggested that Morocco would be untenable from a military point of view. The suspension of the Treaty of Fez undermined Spain's juridical position in Spanish Morocco, since the treaty was the authorization for the establishment of the entire protectorate. France had assigned the northern portion of Morocco to Spain as a zone of influence under the 1912 Treaty of Madrid. But the legal considerations were outweighed by the political and military aspects.

⁴ Hispanic American Report, IX (April 1946), 158.

The Spanish and Moroccan Governments signed a formal declaration and protocol on April 7 which recognized in principle the independence and unity of Morocco. Spain pledged itself to take the necessary measures to transfer authority and to liquidate its protectorate over the one million Moroccans and 18,000 square miles of territory under her control. Negotiations to implement the agreement were to begin in Madrid on May 7. Spanish troops were to remain in the zone during the transition period, the length of which was not specified.⁵

Iberica, a strongly anti-Franco periodical published in New York, in its April 15 issue pointed to the problem that Moroccan independence would pose for Spain. Franco received an early start in his military career by fighting in Morocco. He was promoted to the rank of general at an early age for bravery and outstanding service in this territory. And it was from a subdued Morocco that Franco launched his successful rebellion against the Republic. But now Morocco was slated to become independent.⁶

Iberica argued that the outlook for the military class was as drastic as it was for Franco. With the exceptions of promotions granted for meritorious service in the Civil War, the only future for professional soldiers lay in Moroccan service. The Spaniards were losing a territory that had cost them much blood and treasure to maintain, and the loss would inevitably diminish Spain's prestige, whether rightly or

⁵Ibid.

⁶Iberica, IV (April 15, 1956), 12-13.

wrongly. It was a double blow to the Spanish Army. It affected their morale and made necessary a reduction in numbers, with a corresponding reduction in chances for promotion.⁷ But Iberica neglected to add that granting independence to Morocco was in accordance with the spirit of the times and the disadvantages to Spain would be offset by a great measure of good will toward Spain among the Arab and North African peoples, and in fact, among all the newly emerging nations.

The Question of Algeria

Closely allied to the problems of Morocco were those of Algeria. Although the area belonged to France, Spain had historically been interested in its development. Many Spanish settlers had helped to develop the country. Lequerica presented the Spanish view to the United Nations' First Committee on February 6, 1957. The Spanish delegation had favored placing the matter on the agenda of the General Assembly so as to permit a full discussion of the issue.

Spain had played a significant historical role in Algeria. At about the time of the discovery of America, Spain had occupied Oran and thereafter all the coast from Mers-el-Kebir to Tripoli. After various vicissitudes, Oran and Mers-el-Kebir had been ceded to the Regent of Algiers for commercial concessions. In addition, a great number of Spaniards had settled in Algeria and had contributed to the development of the country. For quite a long time, there had been almost

⁷Whitaker, op. cit., p. 74.

as many Spaniards as Frenchmen in Algeria. Even in 1957, of the 1.2 million Europeans in Algeria, more than 400,000 were of Spanish origin.

More important was the character of the Spanish peninsula as a link between France and Algeria, between Europe and Africa. There was a certain amount of truth in the statement that Africa began at the Pyrenees. Important links of culture and commerce bound Spain to Africa, with whose people it had common roots. The African and Moslem heritage in Spain had left many traces, still visible. Thus Spain felt that it was linked to the Moslem peoples and was in duty bound to cooperate with them. In addition, the free world would be endangered by anything which aroused the hostility of the peoples of North Africa, such as a denial of their equality.⁸

The Spanish position was that a united Europe of free peoples who were ready to defend universal peace could not permit Africa, with its immense network of communications, its territory and enormous resources, to be left open to invasion by powerful aggressive forces which aimed at making of the African continent a gigantic Hungary. The destiny of the peoples of Africa was vital to the defense of civilisation. The problem of their future could not be solved by vague declarations of independence nor by treaties reserving the sacred interests of the parties.

It was essential when launching a new policy and planning the future economy of Africa to pay special attention to the security of the

⁸General Assembly Official Records, 11th Session, First Committee, February 6, 1957, p. 131.

area. The nations charged with maintaining order and justice were obliged to seek, by every means and on the basis of respect for tradition and the rules of law, to establish bonds of friendship with the entire Maghreb and with the Moslem peoples in general. The latter could not be left out in the solution of these problems, and it was necessary to demonstrate to them that their immediate interest called for their consent to the sacrifice necessary in order to achieve friendship with Europe in the cause of their common security.

Colonialism had been rejected by the modern world. In its place had come a policy of collaboration among peoples, a policy which did not seek to make them produce raw materials to enrich the metropolitan areas, but a policy which sought first to enrich the peoples themselves, to raise their standard of living and to accelerate their industrial progress. That was the policy that the United States had introduced and which had nothing in common with the subversion or subjugation of peoples. The new policy went hand in hand with the ideas of friendship and co-existence, and marked the progress of law.⁹

Lequerica did not believe that these considerations were superfluous in examining the Algerian question. Algeria did not involve merely the interpretation of treaties and of legal instruments. Moral factors, history, and the forces involved were among the factors to be taken into consideration in their general context before solving a particular problem. Clearly, the problem was not strictly a colonial one,

⁹Ibid., p. 132.

and those who urged prudence, moderation and clarity were correct in their evaluation.

An objective study of the problem required that consideration be given to the United Nations Charter. It was necessary to have in mind the legal position of France, and in that connection to reread Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter. The occupation and possession of Algeria by France for 120 years, the Constitution of France, and the French Union, together with the legislation enacted by France for Algeria, had a legal value recognized by international law as corresponding to Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter. Lequerica pointed out that this provision constituted a safeguard for the body politic of the United Nations, and that care should be taken not to breach that instrument of protection. The Charter contained a discreet affirmation of the principle of self-determination. But he did not agree that the principle should be employed in an automatic way to favor caprice and subversive activities. Self-determination, which was an instrument of anarchy when it was at the service of intrigue and of impatience, represented a great danger, and the United Nations could never, without risking its own existence, accept such manifestations of it.

Lequerica did not mean to imply indifference to the great suffering of Algeria. The Algerian problem was not solely a legal one, nor did it depend only on the generosity and the resolution of French policy. It was a problem which concerned the entire Mediterranean, and Europe also, and all nations which desired peace, and knew that the Arab nations had a role to play in bringing it about. He was confident that France would bring forward a satisfactory solution to the problem.

There was no question that the Algerian case was different from the question of Tunisia and Morocco. Algeria had a large European population and was considered by the French as a constitutional part of metropolitan France. Tunisia and Morocco were formerly French colonies with only small European communities. Their transition to independence, although resisted by the French Government, can be regarded as having been a more natural development than would be a similar process in Algeria. The fact remained that the Asian-African members of the United Nations who raised the Algerian issue, wanted to use the Assembly as a forum to discuss and promote Algerian independence.¹⁰ The sponsors of two different resolutions on the Algerian situation agreed on a common text in mid-February, and the General Assembly unanimously approved the resulting resolution which "expresses the hope that, in a spirit of co-operation, a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found."¹¹ This final solution was not to come about until France had a strong government in the person of General Charles de Gaulle, who came to power in the following year in large measure on the basis of his pledge to find a definitive answer to the Algerian problem.

The Cyprus Issue

Mediterranean problems were not confined to the western sector. Cyprus was a veritable powder keg at this time. Although about four-

¹⁰Sydney D. Bailey, "Algeria, Cyprus, New Guinea," The Christian Century LXIV (March 27, 1957), 384.

¹¹United Nations Review III (March, 1957), 1.

fifths of the inhabitants of Cyprus are Greek-speaking Christians, there is a minority of Turkish-speaking Moslems. Cyprus is a former part of the Turkish empire and is geographically closer to Turkey than to Greece. The Turkish delegate repeatedly referred to Cyprus as "an off-shore island of Turkey."¹² To compound the problem, Cyprus is slightly nearer to Syria than to either Turkey or Greece. A Syrian political party has as one of its objectives the recovery of Cyprus. Thus, the question of self-determination for Cyprus is not just a question of ending British rule but of deciding who should succeed the British. Speaking at a meeting of the First Committee on February 20, 1957 Lequerica made the Spanish position clear. He declared that the population of Cyprus was largely Greek in composition and had throughout its history been associated with the development of Greek civilization. During the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish domination had created a de facto situation. Turkish rule had been liberal and it had not prevented the Greek majority from developing its own personality. The geographical position of Cyprus, only forty miles from the Turkish coast, and the existence of a relatively large Turkish minority justified Turkey's interest in a settlement of the island's status. Furthermore, the British, whose vigilance had so often contributed to the defense of the free world, considered the territory to be an essential base.¹³

¹² Ibid.

¹³ General Assembly Official Records, 11th Session, February 20, 1957, p. 245.

Considering the legal aspects of the question, a treaty did exist, but even though legal provisions had to be scrupulously complied with, it remained a fact that any treaty was open to revision; this was particularly true of the Treaty of Lausanne, which was a product of the aftermath of the war. The trend of opinion in favor of revising that agreement could not be disregarded. And while the Treaty of Lausanne recognized the United Kingdom's authority over the island it provided that the future of the territory should be discussed with the parties concerned. There was clearly a popular movement in favor of independence, to which the United Nations could not remain indifferent. The future of the Turkish minority could be made the subject of formal guarantees.

Spain considered that the United Nations had a definite duty to perform. While it was not automatically called upon to intervene, it was nevertheless required to express some concern over a dangerous situation.

In the present case, as in the Algerian situation, the Spanish delegation felt that it was necessary to place a restricted interpretation on the right of peoples to self-determination, in order to prevent a deterioration of the situation which would be to the advantage of none of the parties. If the parties concerned really desired it, a solution could be found to the problem of Cyprus, provided account was taken of all the factors involved. Spain understood the anxiety of the United Kingdom over Cyprus, and although the Spanish delegation could not accept an unrestricted application of the principle of self-determination,

neither could it support a system of international policing as applied by the great Powers during the nineteenth century.¹⁴

Lequerica noted that recently the representative of the Soviet Union had attacked the principle of United States bases in Spain and had protested against such establishments (509th Plenary Meeting). For its part, Spain welcomed the bases, which protected the free world, and in the same way fully appreciated the strategic importance of Cyprus. As the United Kingdom experts seemed to consider the island much more important for the members of NATO as a whole than for the United Kingdom alone, that consideration, among others, might facilitate the solution of the problem.

The Cyprus question was not destined to have an easy solution. Again and again agencies of the United Nations have tried to find an answer. Faced with five resolutions in February 1957, four of them controversial, the General Assembly adopted unanimously one offered by India asking for continued negotiations and a peaceful solution. Greece pressed the issue of self-determination for Cyprus in the session of the General Assembly beginning in the autumn of 1957. The Greek resolution won a majority vote in December, but failed of passage because a two-thirds majority was required.¹⁵

Thus the uneasy status quo continued. Britain was unwilling to give up any of her responsibilities for her own defense or that of NATO.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 246.

¹⁵Alzada Comstock, "Uneasy Cyprus," Current History XXXIV (June, 1958), 355.

Turkey was afraid to see Cyprus' military strength weakened, for then she would be even more vulnerable to a Russian attack. Greece had offered in UN debates to let Britain keep the Cyprus bases if union with Greece came about, but different Greek suggestions to Arab and Iron Curtain countries gave the British little confidence in the offer.¹⁶

South West Africa

Spain took part in the discussions in the Fourth Committee on South West Africa. On December 17, 1956, De Lojendio observed that during the course of the debate many lofty thoughts and feelings had been expressed, with which Spain entirely agreed. The fact that chiefly impressed him, however, was that during ten or more years the United Nations had been unable to make any progress with the problem of South West Africa. Perhaps, therefore, the time had come to consider whether the road followed had been the right one.

The course of action so far pursued had been impractical because one essential was lacking; negotiations had been impossible because one of the parties had been absent. Some means should be sought of entering into direct negotiation with the Union Government; otherwise, nothing would be achieved. The most suitable representative of the United Nations in such diplomatic negotiations would be the Secretary-General, who would be able in the light of the situation to suggest what course of action should be followed. To lay down conditions for the Union

¹⁶Ibid., p. 356.

Government and call on it to appear like a prisoner at the bar would only stiffen that Government's attitude.

The adoption of any of the draft resolutions before the Committee would merely be an obstacle to the Secretary-General's accomplishing anything. Lojendio would therefore abstain in the voting. At the same time, he hoped that the Committee might reach agreement to ask the Secretary-General to conduct negotiations on behalf of the United Nations. A resolution might be drafted expressing confidence in the Secretary-General and asking him to initiate conversations with the Union Government. Without some such action there was little hope of achieving a practical solution.¹⁷

The Fourth Committee was moved by the persistent petitioning of Michael Scott and of a young South West African student, Mr. Getzen. It drafted a course of action that at least had the merit of continuing the international pressure on the Union of South Africa. It proposed that a Good Offices Committee be established consisting of three members, of whom the United States and Great Britain agreed to be two. They would seek to find a basis for an agreement which would continue to accord to the territory an international status. The objective, of course, would be to try to persuade the Union of South Africa at least to recognise some international responsibility for the administration of her mandate.

¹⁷General Assembly Official Records, 4th Committee, December 17, 1956, p. 133.

One writer sees more reality in a second approach, only hinted at by the Fourth Committee. He would turn to the International Court for another advisory opinion on the manner in which the Union has fulfilled her trust obligations under the original mandate agreement.¹⁸ Most nations are concerned about the implications of a court ruling on such a question. It might lead to the conclusion that the United Nations should apply sanctions against South Africa. Yet this might well be the most effective means for the UN to deal with a situation that showed little in the way of alternative choices.

Portugal's Territories

Spain's position on UN interference in a country's domestic and constitutional affairs was quite explicit. In a discussion in the Fourth Committee on the Non-Self-Governing Territories, Lojendio supported the Portuguese delegate and said the Committee was unjustified in examining the Portuguese Constitution.¹⁹

Lojendio expanded his position. He declared that he had not been trying to defend Portugal, which needed no defense, but to uphold a basic principle of the United Nations; that of absolute respect for the domestic legislation of Member States, and particularly for their constitutional structure.

¹⁸George Shepherd, Jr., "Our Forgotten Trust: South West Africa," The Christian Century LXXV (January 22, 1958), 95.

¹⁹General Assembly Official Records, 4th Committee, January 31, 1957, p. 341.

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He declared that Spain and Portugal had never been colonial Powers, or even colonizing countries; they had been "civilizing" countries; inasmuch as colonialism, understood as a system of extracting wealth and raw materials by using poorly paid indigenous labor, was a concept which had emerged in world history when Spain and Portugal had already completed their expansion. The work of Portugal and Spain had been primarily one of Catholic spiritual and cultural unity, as the representatives of Brazil and Spain's sister nations in America had testified.

Portugal had established and maintained that unity across various continents; and the Portuguese in all those continents had the same mental attitude, at the same time Catholic and tolerant, which disavowed all racial discrimination. While honoring a glorious tradition, the Portuguese were known for their modern ideas. Unity of spirit was the very essence of Portugal's personality, and with that spirit it had come into the United Nations. Nobody could impugn it.

The transmission of information on Non-Self-Governing Territories had been adopted as a means of accumulating a common fund of political experience, to be used for improving the government of less civilized peoples. It had never been intended as a weapon for criticising the administration of Member States, a practice which could lead to dangerous abuse. In any case, few countries were entitled to as much credit as Portugal, which had earned it in the course of several centuries of exemplary history.²⁰

²⁰General Assembly Official Records, 4th Committee, February 1, 1957, p. 347.

There is a great deal of evidence that the world is not a simple one.

The world is a complex one, and it is not a simple one. It is a world of many different people, many different cultures, and many different languages. It is a world of many different religions, many different philosophies, and many different ways of life. It is a world of many different problems, many different challenges, and many different opportunities. It is a world of many different hopes, many different dreams, and many different aspirations. It is a world of many different joys, many different sorrows, and many different experiences. It is a world of many different things, many different people, and many different possibilities.

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The subsequent draft resolution (A/C.4/L.467) would have set up an ad hoc committee. The Japanese representative, Mr. Tsuchiya considered this tantamount to questioning the integrity of a Member State. He did not think such a committee could serve a constructive purpose, and he was in favor of accepting the Portuguese Government's statement without further controversy. Lojendio shared these views and noted that he would vote against the draft resolution. He was surprised that the sponsors had denied its discriminatory character, for the replies of earlier Members to the Secretary-General's inquiry had not been examined by any such committee as that now envisaged. It would not be fair to submit the Portuguese declaration to such scrutiny when that procedure had not been followed in other cases. There had never been any move to question whether Siberia, for example, was self-governing. If such a committee were established, it should examine all replies submitted by the Member States.²¹

The draft resolution was adopted by 35 votes to 33, with 4 abstentions. Lojendio noted that it was obvious from the result that the draft resolution would not obtain the required two-thirds majority in plenary session. He emphasized that Spain's delay in sending a reply to the Secretary-General's letter should not be interpreted as a desire to avoid any obligations arising from Article 73. Nor should it be understood as a lack of courtesy to the Fourth Committee if his Government declined the invitation extended in operative paragraph 2 of the

²¹ General Assembly Official Records, 4th Committee, February 5, 1957, p. 368.

draft resolution.²² Lojendio was proved correct when the Committee recommendation, dealing with the transmission of information under Article 73e was rejected in plenary by a vote of 35 in favor, 35 against, and 5 abstentions.²³

Transmission of Information Under Article 73

Under Article 73 United Nations member States responsible for administering territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government have accepted as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories. The administering powers are also bound to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment and their protection against abuses; to develop self-government; to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and their varying stages of advancement. Finally, each State is to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitations as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible.²⁴

²²Ibid., p. 370.

²³United Nations Review III (April 1957), 54.

²⁴United Nations Review V (August 1958), 32.

Lojendio presented the Spanish position on the draft resolution relating to the transmission of information under Article 73 on February 20, 1957. He noted that this article implied that the definition of Non-Self-Governing Territories is a matter exclusively for the countries concerned. Thus it followed under the Charter that the General Assembly had no jurisdiction in the matter, for the powers and function of the Assembly cannot be interpreted in such a way as to broaden them. To do this would be contrary to an essential, general and fundamental principle of law.

The draft resolution referred to resolution 334 (IV) which further confirmed the Spanish view, for in the resolution the General Assembly states that it

. . . considers that it is within the responsibility of the General Assembly to express its opinion on the principles which have guided or which may in the future guide the Members concerned in enumerating the territories for which the obligation exists to transmit information under Article 73e of the Charter.²⁵

The Spanish delegate observed that this has always been the understanding of the United Nations, as was shown by the fact that Members' replies to the official inquiry addressed to them by the Secretary-General have always been accepted, without discussion or investigation. Before Portugal, many countries with vast, scattered and remote territories about whose political systems little was known or asked about, made negative replies and the United Nations accepted the

²⁵General Assembly Official Records, 11th Session, February 20, 1957, p. 1167.

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replies received. Why then was it necessary to single out Portugal?

He pointed out that the Portuguese declaration merely reflected the clear provisions of the Portuguese Constitution under which Portugal is a unitary State with a single government and a single territory, although its various parts have no geographical continuity, as in the case with many other Member States. He argued that any discussion in the UN of the Portuguese Government's reply would be tantamount to a discussion of the Constitution of Portugal, which would be a direct violation of the limiting clauses of the Charter.

Lojendio emphasized not only Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, but Article 73, which, in accordance with the same principle, makes the transmission of information subject to "such limitations as security and constitutional considerations may require."²⁶ He underscored the phrase "constitutional considerations." Moreover, any resolution which might be adopted along the lines proposed would be adopted in the knowledge that it would necessarily be inoperative, as the Portuguese Government could not, even if it wished, give any reply other than that which it did because constitutional provisions are outside the jurisdiction of Governments and not subject to their wishes.

This attitude coincided with that of the United States. The latter recognized that the General Assembly was entitled to discuss and express itself on the meaning and application of Chapter XI. At the same time it was left to each member to decide what specific responsibil-

²⁶Ibid.

ities it had assumed and what specific actions it should take with respect to the territories which it administers.

The United States considered that each member of the United Nations must decide which territories, if any, it will report on to the United Nations under Article 73c. It recognized the temptation to criticize members for alleged failure to report on certain areas. Nevertheless, it believed that the great strength of the United Nations consisted in setting examples of action which would lead all members to see the advantage of voluntary and wholehearted compliance with the provisions of the Charter.²⁷

Lojendio also raised the point that the text of the draft resolution referred to newly admitted Members and the establishment of an ad hoc committee to study the application of the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter to newly admitted Members. He argued that the draft resolution was flatly discriminatory and was contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Charter. Lojendio's point was that there are no old and new Members in the Organization; there are no admitted Members and founding Members. All Members of the United Nations were equal and therefore any decision made in regard to new Members must apply to old Members as well, and decisions not taken in regard to old Members cannot be applied to new Members. Lojendio noted that there were in the UN countries with vast territories with remote provinces and islands and "we do not know if they are self-governing or not."²⁸ The draft

²⁷The Department of State Bulletin XXXVII (December 2, 1957), 56.

²⁸General Assembly Official Records, 11th Session, February 20, 1957, p. 1158.

resolution was rejected in plenary by a vote of 35 in favor, 35 against, and 5 abstentions.²⁹

Social and Economic Matters

In general, Spain has voted with the United States and the Western Bloc on social and economic matters, including the problems of refugees. She took exception to the Draft Convention on the Nationality of Married Women.

Speaking in the Third Committee, Manuel Aznar explained that Spain had not participated in the discussions leading to the adoption of the first three articles, which were the substantive articles of the Draft Convention. Consequently, she had had no opportunity to point out that they were entirely inconsistent with Spanish legislation. The principle on which Spanish law and life was founded was that of family unity. The institution of marriage, which was the basis of family unity, was already threatened in many ways and it was not advisable, in the view of the Spanish Government, to place it in greater danger by subscribing to a draft Convention which might be used to weaken it. He had therefore abstained in the voting.³⁰

In the Third Committee, on 13 December 1956, Aznar, speaking on the draft International Covenant on Human Rights, thought that the phrase "Work being at the basis of all human endeavor" was too general and too

²⁹United Nations Review III (April 1957), 54.

³⁰General Assembly Official Records, 3rd Committee, December 7, 1956, p. 114.

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agree; he considered that the exact meaning of the various terms required definition. There was such a thing as human endeavor which was not based on work, in the most usual sense of the term. He would vote for the deletion of the phrase.

Aznar objected to the wording of the amendments submitted by Afghanistan. In defining the expression "right to work," "if he so desires" could be construed as a kind of authorization of social parasitism, idleness or laziness. Work was not only a right; it was a duty. The Spanish delegation supported the provisions of article 6 in general, and sincerely hoped that those words would be deleted.³¹

Aznar spoke again on the 18th, and tried to clarify a few points relating to the amendment proposed by his delegation (A/C.3/L. 533).³² The Chilean representative had pointed out that certain social groups needed special protection by the State. Workers constituted such a group; in some countries they did not enjoy the same advantages as civil servants and were not paid, as the latter were, for public holidays. A number of delegations had opposed certain amendments on the grounds that they merely repeated provisions appearing in other articles of the draft covenant; but the principle of remuneration for public holidays was mentioned nowhere and the expression "periodic holidays with pay" did not, as the Chinese representative thought, include public holidays. It was essential that this important principle be included in the

³¹General Assembly Official Records, 2nd Committee, December 17, 1956, p. 137.

³²See UN document (A/C.3/L. 533).

Covenant in order to eliminate the discrimination against workers as compared with State employees.³³

Angel Sager in a speech of 31 January 1957 agreed with the Greek representative that the maintenance of peace was intimately bound up with respect for human rights. Those rights had been proclaimed in the United Nations Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but no machinery existed as yet to prevent their violation. It was, furthermore, clear that the entry into effect of the Covenants was still remote. The Spanish delegation was therefore greatly attracted to the Greek proposal (A/C.3/L. 992),³⁴ but would like explanations of certain points.

He first questioned whether it was conceivable that a complaint by one Member State against another could be completely divested of all political associations. He asked, secondly, by what standards the seriousness of a violation would be measured. And thirdly, how many members the proposed committee would have, how it would be appointed and how it would be possible to ensure that all its members put aside all political considerations. Fourthly, it might happen that the complaints submitted would not all deal with collective violations of human rights, and that a State might lodge a complaint on behalf of one of its nationals. The committee would then find itself acting as a world supreme court with extremely wide jurisdiction, and available free of

³³ 715th Meeting, 18 December 1956, p. 174.

³⁴ See UN document (A/C.3/L. 992).

charge.egas wanted to know whether the Greek representative had considered the number and variety of the complaints that might be submitted annually. Fifthly, he asked whether the Greek delegation did not think that the State complained against would hasten to allege violations on the part of the complaining State, which would be likely to create unprecedented confusion instead of redressing the legal balance.³⁵ Lastly, he asked if the committee would not be hampered in its work by the fact that it would not have the backing of the Covenants, in particular, those of their provisions which laid down the consequences of violations of human rights, and that a mere report by the committee would not be sufficient to provide redress.³⁶

The Committee adopted, by a vote of 47 to none with 17 abstentions, a resolution sponsored by Greece under which the General Assembly would transmit to the Commission on Human Rights official records and documents of its discussion of measures for dealing with violations of human rights.³⁷ In plenary action, the General Assembly decided to transmit to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights the records of the Third Committee's debate on interim measures to be taken in regard to violations of human rights. The decision was adopted 54 to none, with 15 abstentions.³⁸

³⁵General Assembly Official Records, 3rd Committee, January 31, 1957, p. 336.

³⁶Ibid. See pages 336-337 for Uruguay argument. The individual was tending increasingly to be recognized as a subject of international law.

³⁷United Nations Review III (March 1957), 50.

³⁸United Nations Review III (April 1957), 54.

and the other side of the mountain. The first of these is the mountain itself, which is a very high and steep mountain. The second is the river, which is a very wide and deep river. The third is the forest, which is a very dense and thick forest. The fourth is the people, who are a very brave and strong people. The fifth is the land, which is a very fertile and rich land. The sixth is the sky, which is a very blue and clear sky. The seventh is the sun, which is a very bright and hot sun. The eighth is the moon, which is a very bright and cold moon. The ninth is the stars, which are a very bright and cold stars. The tenth is the earth, which is a very fertile and rich earth.

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Legal Matters

A draft resolution was submitted by the Latin American States to the Sixth Committee on November 23, 1956, increasing the number of members of the International Law Commission. Castro Rial of Spain supported the resolution and pointed out that the current composition was based upon a situation which had been changed by the admission of new Members to the United Nations. The legal systems and forms of civilization of those States, too, should be represented on the Commission. Furthermore, the new personalities that would be called upon to participate in the Commission's work would enhance the prestige of that body.³⁹

Castro Rial noted that the International Law Commission's draft articles on the law of the sea (A/3197, Chap. II) steered a middle course between the dangerously static concept of lex lata and the equally dangerous dynamic concept of lex ferenda. The Commission grouped together systematically all the rules it had adopted concerning the high seas, the territorial sea, the continental shelf, the contiguous zone and the conservation of the living resources of the sea. The final report on the subject was in two parts, the first dealing with the territorial sea and the second with the high seas. The second part was divided into three sections: (1) general regime of the high seas; (2) contiguous zone; (3) continental shelf. Each article was accompanied by a commentary.

³⁹General Assembly Official Records, 6th Committee, November 23, 1956, p. 12.

Spain had joined the sponsors of the draft resolution on the convening of an international conference (A/C.6/L. 305/Add. 3); such a conference was essential because the General Assembly had no legislative powers and there were many aspects of the international law of the sea which stood in need of positive rules having the greatest possible degree of universality.⁴⁰

With regard to the breadth of the territorial sea, the majority of States had considered it desirable to lay down a fixed limit which was normally between three and six miles; Spain, like other Mediterranean States, applied a limit of six miles. Some States, and they were the exception, claimed between nine and twelve miles. All agreed, however, on the respect due to the principle of the freedom of the sea.

Spain's attitude of respect for the freedom of the seas derived from the universalist principles of Vitoria and the other founders of international law. The Spanish delegation noted with regret that, at a time when the colonialist and imperialistic ideas of the nineteenth century had been abandoned, claims were being made that in effect treated the high seas as a res nullius to be virtually colonized and subjected to the exercise of State sovereignty, to the detriment of the common enjoyment of its resources by all nations, including land-locked nations, which had an equal right to a reasonable enjoyment of those resources.

⁴⁰General Assembly Official Records, 6th Committee, December 5, 1956, p. 53.

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It was vitally important that the rules governing the delimitation of the territorial sea should not be subject to alteration by the unilateral action of States; it was not desirable that the breadth of the territorial sea should be made contingent upon the food requirements or the interest in fisheries of particular States, for if it were, the delimitation of the territorial sea would be governed by such vague considerations that the stability of the political frontiers of States would be impaired. Perhaps it was possible to arrive at a compromise satisfactory both to coastal States and to fishing States without introducing such elements of uncertainty.

The success of the whole idea of codifying the law of the sea would depend to a great extent on the way in which the question of the living resources of high seas was resolved. The Spanish delegation was much impressed with the idea of the special interest of the coastal State. At the same time it was essential that the general interest of the international community should be safeguarded. It had also to be borne in mind that certain States had been traditionally engaged in fishing on the high seas; Spain and Iceland, for example, were no less vitally interested in the conservation of the living resources of the high seas than was any particular coastal State.

In the modern world, the interdependence of States was such that the old theory of absolute sovereignty was yielding ground steadily. Consequently there was an urgent need for dealing with the question of the living resources of the sea at the international level. Castro Rial thought that the interests of coastal and of fishing States could be

reconciled in such a manner as to exclude both the concept of absolute sovereignty and that of exclusive monopolies.

In connection with the Commission's proposal for compulsory arbitration, the Spanish delegation reserved the right to propose amendments at a later stage. It was interesting to recall that in 1953 the Commission had proposed the setting up of an international authority to prescribe a system of regulation for the purpose of protecting fishery resources (A/2456, para. 94).⁴¹ Perhaps such a body could, in addition to its technical duties, deal with the settlement of disputes between States in the matter.

Spain reserved the right to submit its views to the proposed conference on the detailed provisions of the Commission's draft articles.⁴²

Spanish Action in the Special Political Committee

The issue of South African race relations in general had been considered by the General Assembly since 1952, when it was placed on the agenda as "the question of race conflict resulting from the policies of apartheid (race separation) of the Government of the Union of South Africa."⁴³ The Union Government objected to its consideration, maintaining that this was contrary to the provisions of the Charter concerning intervention in the domestic affairs of Member States.

⁴¹See UN document (A/2456).

⁴²General Assembly Official Records, 11 Session, Special Political Committee, January 9, 1957, pp. 43-44.

⁴³United Nations Review II (January 1956), 51.

In November of 1952 the Assembly resolved that the policy of apartheid was necessarily based on doctrines of racial persecution and established a three-member Commission to study the South African race situation in the light of the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. The Commission had submitted three reports to the Assembly, in 1953, 1954, and to the tenth session in 1955, based on data available outside the Union of South Africa. The latest report found that the Union's policy of apartheid continued to pose a serious threat to national life within the country, as well as constituting a seriously disturbing factor in international affairs.⁴⁴

Lojendio took the occasion of the joint draft resolution on race conflict in South Africa, on 21 January 1957, to say that his delegation, along with Portugal, would vote for the fifth paragraph of the preamble.⁴⁵ It would abstain on the first four paragraphs since Spain was not a Member State when the General Assembly resolutions had been adopted. Spain was opposed to operative paragraphs 1 and 2 because, by placing the Union of South Africa in the dock, the very purpose of the resolution, namely to persuade the Union government to come back into the United Nations to negotiate a settlement, was defeated. It was opposed to operative paragraph 3 because it had serious doubts regarding the power of the Assembly, under the Charter, to intervene in matters of domestic jurisdiction.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ See UN document (A/SPC/L.6).

⁴⁶ General Assembly Official Records, 11th Session, Special Political Committee, January 21, 1957, p. 74.

Lojendio spoke again in the Special Political Committee on 23 January and noted that despite the divergencies of opinion there seemed to be at least agreement on two vital points: first, on the principle of the universality of the United Nations, and secondly, on the fact that Korea and Viet Nam fulfilled the requirements laid down by the Charter for membership of the United Nations. The fact that it had not been possible to reach a general agreement on those premises was due to the fact that Korea and Viet Nam were divided into two parts, the northern part of each country being occupied by foreign military forces. Some delegations, in particular those sponsoring the thirteen-Power draft resolution, maintained that the Governments of South Korea and South Viet Nam were the legal governments of Korea and Viet Nam.⁴⁷ The Spanish Government held that view and would accordingly vote for the draft resolution favoring the admission to the United Nations of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet Nam. It would also support the amendments which Argentina had proposed to the texts.⁴⁸

The compromise proposal submitted by the Soviet Union called for the simultaneous admission of the four countries which now constituted Korea and Viet Nam and was described by the Spanish delegate as merely a maneuver to secure political advantages within the United Nations and to have the division of Korea and Viet Nam sanctioned by the United Nations, contrary to the decisions it had adopted.⁴⁹ On February

⁴⁷See UN documents (A/SPC/L.7, A/SPC/L.8 and Corr. 1).

⁴⁸See UN documents (A/SPC/L.10, A/SPC/L.11 and Corr. 1).

⁴⁹General Assembly Official Records, 11th Session, Special Political Committee, January 23, 1957, p. 20. Also see UN document (A/SPC/L.7).

25 the General Assembly requested the Security Council to reconsider membership applications for Viet Nam and the Republic of Korea, holding that the two nations were fully qualified for membership.⁵⁰

Twenty new states had been admitted during the previous year, but Korea and Viet Nam had been prevented by the veto on the part of the Soviet Union.⁵¹ This situation was to continue as one of the manifestations of the cold war between the East and the West. After two meetings on September 9, the Security Council failed to endorse the favorable recommendations on each of the three applicants. Proposals for the admission of the Republic of Korea and Viet Nam, while supported by ten members of the Council, were not adopted because of negative votes cast by a permanent member of the Council, the Soviet Union. The admission of the Mongolian People's Republic was also denied, after a Soviet proposal for membership failed to obtain the necessary majority of seven affirmative votes.⁵²

Disarmament

This perennial problem had long gripped the United Nations. The question of nuclear tests in particular overshadowed all other disarmament matters during the assembly. Canada, Japan and Norway proposed a

⁵⁰United Nations Review III (April 1957), 2.

⁵¹Edward S. Greenbaum, The Department of State Bulletin XLVI (February 25, 1957), 332.

⁵²United Nations Review IV (October 1957), 43.

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system of advance registration of tests as a preliminary step toward eventual prohibition. Sweden asked for a complete moratorium on tests pending a full report from the UN committee on atomic radiation. The communist countries again suggested the prohibition of manufacture and use of nuclear weapons, though without making proposals on the difficult question of how such a ban could be enforced.⁵³

The Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission had held its first meeting in London in 1954. In all the long discussions the fond hopes for a settlement had failed to materialize in an agreement. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, told the 1957 meeting that there had been a certain narrowing of the differences among the major powers. Yet he was quick to admit that the progress which had been made was small in relation to what still needed to be done.⁵⁴

Manuel Aznar spoke to the First Committee on January 22, 1957 and noted that Spain was taking part in the debate on disarmament for the first time. Nevertheless the Spanish Government had shown a strong interest in the problem for many years in the League of Nations. The atmosphere at Geneva, in the days after the First World War, had been filled with eloquent statements and solemn declarations, but the Second World War emphasized the catastrophic failure of pacifism and revealed its fundamental ineffectuality. In the modern world where the problem was

⁵³Sydney D. Bailey, "Disarmament: Next Steps," The Christian Century LXXIV (March 13, 1957), 320.

⁵⁴"Disarmament," United Nations Review III (May 1957), 6.

far more serious because of the advent of nuclear weapons, the Spanish Government wished to repeat its intention to work for peace.

Aznar believed that the basic reasons for the arms race lay in the political problems and conflicts which divided men into irreconcilable groups. The Spanish delegation agreed with the views expressed by a number of delegations, such as that of Italy (834th meeting). It agreed with the opinions expressed by the delegation of the United States (821st meeting) when it maintained that no effective disarmament was possible without the establishment of effective international control. If the Soviet Union honestly wished to contribute to the peace of the world, control was the means by which all its fears could be overcome.⁵⁵ Aznar declared that it would be a major achievement if the suggestions set forth in the United States' memorandum (A/C. 1/783) could be crystallized. If this were accomplished, the nations of the world would be at the threshold of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes, which would open a great new era in human civilization.

The General Assembly adopted a resolution on February 14, 1957 which welcomed the progress made on certain aspects of the disarmament problem by the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.⁵⁶ It requested the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its Sub-Committee at an early date and recommended that the Commission and the Sub-Committee give prompt attention to the various proposals which had been submitted to the United Nations.

⁵⁵General Assembly Official Records, 1st Committee, January 22, 1957, p. 75.

⁵⁶"Disarmament," United Nations Review III (May 1957), 6.

The Assembly recommended continued consideration of President Eisenhower's plan for exchanging military blueprints and for mutual aerial inspection and of Prime Minister Bulganin's plan for establishing control posts at strategic centers.

Perhaps the most encouraging part of the very complex problem of disarmament was the willingness of the great powers to discuss the problem. Spain typified the apprehension of the smaller powers toward the disarmament question, but in the final analysis, whether disarmament would or would not be achieved depended almost entirely on the attitude of the great powers, the members of the "Nuclear Club."

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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Spanish Foreign Relations

Spain joined the United Nations with a great deal of enthusiasm. As we have seen, she claimed that her election to United Nations membership was her greatest foreign policy triumph since the military and economic agreements with the United States in September 1953. And Spain believed that her election to United Nations membership was no more than an act of justice. A society of nations must be universal by virtue of its juridical character, and it is an innate right of States to belong to it, provided they are sovereign and independent and join the organization with the purpose of serving its peaceful goals.¹

In Spanish eyes, the main weakness of the United Nations has been and still is its lack of any effective means of enforcing its decisions. Nevertheless they considered the weight of its high moral authority a better factor in the cause of peace than the use of force by the powerful. This emphasis upon the moral aspects of United Nations activities is characteristic of the Spanish outlook, based upon her Catholic and philosophic traditions.

When the Hungarian rebellion and the subsequent bloody repression by the Soviet Union took place, Spain was outraged. Her position

¹General Assembly Official Records, 10th Session, September 20, 1955, p. 507.

SECTION 1

ARTICLE I

SECTION 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

SECTION 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

But no Representative shall be chosen for a longer Term than two Years; and no Person shall be Representative who shall not, when elected, have seven Years Residence in the United States; and no Person shall be Representative who shall not, when elected, be seven Years of Age.

SECTION 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for a Term of six Years; and each Senator shall have the Qualifications requisite for Senators of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

SECTION 4. The Senate shall have the sole and exclusive Power of trying all Cases impeached by the House of Representatives, when sitting, and when absent the Chief Justice of the United States.

SECTION 5. The Senate shall have the sole and exclusive Power of confirming and rejecting all Appointments of the President, and all Commissions of the President.

SECTION 6. The Senate shall have the sole and exclusive Power of ratifying and rejecting all Treaties made by the President, and all Commissions of the President.

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was much more extreme than that of the United States. This is perhaps not overly surprising in view of the ultimate and relative responsibility of the two nations in preserving world peace. Nevertheless the Spanish were sincere in wanting the United Nations to take effective action in Hungary as the organization had done in Suez, by establishing a police force, that would restore order and establish peace between the resisting Hungarian people and the invading Soviet troops. Lequerica offered Spanish troops for this purpose, as many as were within Spain's capability.²

Spain found herself on the horns of a dilemma over the Suez controversy. She aspired to play a leading role in North Africa and had courted the Arab nations since the end of World War II. Yet she felt herself to be a European power and had military and economic ties with the United States. In addition, a large part of her foreign trade depended on free use of the Suez Canal. The Franco regime welcomed the invitation to participate in the international conference in London on the Canal. Spain hoped to play a constructive role at this conference. The London Conference was especially significant as it was the first international conference attended by representatives of the Franco Government.

There was little question that Spain entered her first international political conference of the post-war period aligned with the Western European powers. She had cultivated and highly valued the

²General Assembly Official Records, Second Emergency Special Session, November 4, 1956, p. 11.

THESE ARE THE ONLY TWO CASES IN WHICH THE COURT HAS
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friendship of North Africa and intended to keep that friendship. But, at the same time, if Spain had to choose, she would choose Europe, since she was dependent on the use of the Canal and she believed that she could not face the future with security unless the Canal were internationalized.

This period saw a rapid shift in Spanish attitudes toward France and North Africa. In the early post-World War II period Spain was self-consciously pro-Arab and championed their interests against French and British aspirations in North Africa. It is perhaps more than a coincidence that after joining the United Nations in December 1955 these policies began to change. Morocco is a very clear case in point. From a policy that frowned on granting extensive self-government, the Spanish Government granted full independence to the Spanish sector of Morocco, all this within a span of several months.

It can be argued that the French action in their sector, by unilaterally abrogating the 1912 Treaty of Fes, forced the Spanish to do likewise. But a strong case can also be built around the fact that Spain was quite sensitive to the pressures of world opinion in the United Nations. More than anything else she aspired to a position of moral authority and leadership among the Latin-American States. With the French action a fait accompli, the handwriting was on the wall. Spain did the graceful thing and granted full independence to the Spanish sector of Morocco. Spain still visualized herself as the bridge between Europe and North Africa. What better way to cement good relations with the Moslem States than by a magnanimous gesture toward the Sultan of Morocco?

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Spain revealed the shift in its pro-Arab orientation especially in Lequerica's speech in the United Nations' First Committee on February 6, 1957.³ The Spanish delegate did not desert the Arabs in the Algerian crisis, but emphasized Spain's historical and cultural links with Algeria. Yet he did not favor a carte blanche that would give outright independence to Algeria. Lequerica tried to bring in the idea of North African security as an integral part of the Algerian question. And clearly he did not want to alienate France. In studying the whole problem, he made it clear that he favored the legal position of France, and underlined Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter. He emphasized that Spain considered Algeria to be a domestic problem of France, that occupation and possession for 130 years, the French Constitution, and French legislation had a legal value recognized by international law. Lequerica believed that Article 2, paragraph 7, was a legal safeguard for all the Members of the United Nations and that care should be taken to preserve this protection.

Spain did not deny the principle of self-determination as affirmed in the Charter. But great care was needed in its application, and not an automatic application of the principle. Self-determination was an instrument of anarchy when it was at the service of intrigues and premature independence movements. Lequerica was not indifferent to the suffering in Algeria, but he observed the fact that the Algerian problem was not strictly a legal one. He was confident that France would

³General Assembly Official Records, 11th Session, First Committee, February 6, 1957, p. 131.

come forward with a satisfactory solution to the whole involved question. Spain's attitude was somewhat parallel in the case of Cyprus. She felt that, as in the Algerian situation, it was necessary to place a restricted interpretation on the right of self-determination, in order to prevent a deterioration of the situation as a whole, which would benefit none of the parties.⁴ Yet Spain was equally insistent that it would not support a system of international policing as applied by the Great Powers in the nineteenth century. Ispuerica considered that some scheme whereby Great Britain might relinquish her interests in the island to those of NATO might be a satisfactory solution to the conflicts of interest.

In the discussions on South West Africa, Spain favored direct negotiations between the Secretary-General and the Union Government. She did not favor laying down conditions for the Union Government, feeling this would only make the latter more adamant.

Spain is linked to Portugal in the Iberian Pact, but very likely would have supported her neighbor even without the treaty. Spain's position was to support Portugal during a discussion in the 4th Committee on the Non-Self-Governing Territories. As in the French position on Algeria, Spain declared that it was a basic principle of the United Nations, that of absolute respect for the domestic legislation of Member States and particularly for their constitutional structure.⁵ Lojendio,

⁴General Assembly Official Records, 11th Session, February 20, 1957, p. 245.

⁵General Assembly Official Records, 4th Committee, January 31, 1957, p. 341.

the Spanish representative, supported the Portuguese delegate and declared that the Committee was unjustified in examining the Portuguese Constitution.

Domestic Affairs

Spain showed an enthusiasm and sense of purpose in foreign affairs that was not matched on the domestic scene. Here unrest among the university students, dissent among the intellectuals, labor strife and rural discontent harassed the government.

Franco devoted his entire New Year's Day message of January 1, 1956 to the need for national solidarity. He acknowledged the unrest among the university students and the workers, and the dissatisfaction among the intellectuals. Franco ascribed the unrest to a "venom of materialism" propagated by the radio broadcasts of the Communist countries.⁶ He was concerned about the younger generation which had not experienced the horrors of the Civil War and did not understand the need to fight "the forces of evil" which had not given up their goal of destroying Spain.

The Caudillo referred to the question of the succession. He declared that the problem would be solved in accordance with existing laws that envisage the re-establishment of a monarchy in Spain. He repeated his previous statements that the future King must accept a continuation of the present regime.⁷

⁶Arriba, Madrid, January 1, 1956.

⁷New York Times, January 1, 1956, p. 3.

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Student dissent in Spain was made apparent in the results of a poll conducted by the Institute of Public Opinion, a department of the Ministry of Information. The results showed that the great majority of Madrid University students were opposed to Spain's totalitarian regime.⁸ Spanish experts concluded that dissatisfaction with the current economic and social conditions together with a lack of political experience made the youths an easy target for Communist propaganda.

The results of the poll were not published in Spain, but a detailed report was written by José María Pinillos, Professor of Experimental Psychology at Madrid University. He analyzed the answers and wrote the conclusions, which were distributed privately in official and diplomatic circles.

Some of the results follow: political working class (the Government); 74 percent of the students accuse its members of incompetence, lacking seriousness of purpose, amateurish, ignorant; 85 percent accuse them of immorality, comedians, ambitious without scruples, false.

Members of the military hierarchy; 90 percent accuse them of incompetence, ignorant, bureaucratic, worthless; 46 percent accuse them of immorality, libertines, brutal, heavy drinkers.

University professors; 67 percent consider themselves a generation without teachers, not because there are no teachers, but because of the lack of sincerity or devotion to duty among professors.

Ecclesiastical hierarchy; 52 percent accuse its members of immorality, ostentatious, ambitious; 90 percent do not believe that the

⁸New York Times, January 4, 1956, p. 1.

social policy of the Church is accepted by the people; 65 percent believe that the Church does not show enough concern for the working class.

Of the students consulted, 60 percent were decidedly opposed to any form of totalitarian regime, 20 percent supported totalitarianism in principle but disagreed with the way that the regime was managing public affairs, and 20 percent were politically indifferent. The report noted that the attitudes did not stem from a clearly expressed progressive ideology, but only from disagreement with the existing situation.⁹

On January 21 Dr. Lain Entralgo, the Rector of Madrid University warned that steps must be taken to improve political, cultural and social conditions. He cited dissatisfaction among college students, not only in Madrid, but throughout Spain.¹⁰ Dr. Entralgo declared that Spanish youth was becoming increasingly more susceptible to the attractions of other political systems, especially those that offer social justice and real participation in public life and the widening of the professional horizon, which he described as so limited for most of Spanish youth.¹¹

In 1956, Frank Manuel could find no nostalgia for the Republican period. In scores of conversations, not a single Republican leader was mentioned with veneration. Not one heroic image had survived from the

⁹Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁰New York Times, January 22, 1956, p. 24.

¹¹Dr. Entralgo was appointed Rector in 1951. He is a Doctor of Psychology and Psychiatry, and author of many scientific and historical books. A liberal Roman Catholic, he joined the National Movement at the outbreak of the Civil War.

Republican epoch.¹² The Republic is remembered as a government that promised many things, and fulfilled few of them. "In Spain," intelligent Spaniards sometimes remark, "we have no political problem--only political problems."¹³

In September Herbert Matthews wrote that the regime of General Franco had never been stronger or more stable. Yet he believed that it could be overthrown in a few weeks or, on the other hand, last another twenty years. Matthews described Spain as existing on two planes; the surface showed a constantly though slowly improving economic picture and a civic peace that approached apathy. Underneath was a ferment of discontent and a desire for liberty that grew stronger every day.¹⁴

Matthews argues that the widely accepted view that Franco retains power by playing off the Army, Falange, Church and big business is false. He declares that only the Army and the Church really count and they are not balanced against each other. The bankers and the business men are allowed much latitude, but are at the mercy of the bureaucratic state.

He calls the Falange a shadow, a scarecrow that Franco picks up and shakes threateningly every now and then. It has no great power in itself. Its present policies have no coherence or reality because the

¹² Frank Manuel, "The Two Spains," The Antioch Review XVI (March 1956), 10.

¹³ R. F. A. Coles, "General Franco Survives," Contemporary Review No. 1099 (July 1957), p. 13.

¹⁴ New York Times, September 17, 1956, p. 1.

movement is divided into many factions with many different views. Virtually every adult Spaniard belongs to the Falange, which tends to make it relatively meaningless. The entire labor movement was given by Franco to the Falange but insofar as the Falange has any agreed philosophy of labor the top leaders concede that it is an ideal for the distant future.

The Army is completely under Franco's control but it is the only force in Spain along with the police that has the arms and the ability to rule the country when Franco is gone.

The Catholic Church is very powerful, never more so in the history of Spain. Yet it is quite obvious that a theocracy will not supplant General Franco.

Matthews describes Spain not as a totalitarian country, but an authoritarian one. The authority is exercised by keeping all component parts of the regime weak or in conflict with each other. This makes General Franco's power supreme, when he chooses to utilize it. As long as his position is not attacked and the nation's affairs run smoothly, he keeps hands off.

It is not a cruel regime, in the Nazi or Communist sense. The prevailing tone is one of apathy and tranquillity, but everyone says what he pleases. This is what gives such a surprising air of freedom in a country that could hardly be less free in fundamental civic rights.

Matthews argues that the basic force holding the regime together is fear of another civil war or great internal strife. Spaniards feel quite strongly about people who would sacrifice the well-being and even

the lives of other Spaniards through opposition to General Franco. There is a great deal of intellectual and emotional opposition to him, but not in a revolutionary sense.¹⁵

The per capita gross national product in Spain in 1956 was \$255, less than one-half the average of other European countries and about one-seventh that of the United States. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe reported that Spanish industrial and agricultural workers have a standard of living 10 to 30 percent lower than before the Civil War, even with the social services. The basic wage of an industrial worker or peasant ranges between the equivalent of 50 cents and \$1 a day; social services would add 20 to 50 cents. The distribution of wealth is so unjust that 83 percent of the Spanish people account for less than one-third of the national income.¹⁶

The best feature of the Spanish labor situation is the program of social services. Social security covers accidents, health and old age insurance, family allowances, marriage grants and paid vacations. It can be argued that in the post-war years the democracies have done more in the field of social services than Spain has, nevertheless the Spanish social services are good enough to meet the standards of the International Labor Organization.

Hugh Trevor-Roper evaluated the Franco Government in the September 2, 1956 New York Times. He noted that the Government was not popular,

¹⁵Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁶New York Times, September 18, 1956, p. 16.

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that it had no institutions to give it natural permanence. But it did have internal strength which he thought would enable it to weather the recent smaller crises just as it had survived far greater ones in the past.

Trevor-Roper concurs with Matthews in that this internal strength is partly a negative strength, that it is the resignation and acceptance of the people. To all who remember it, the Civil War is a horrible memory. Atrocities were committed on both sides, and even those who hate General Franco most for his share in the responsibility accept him as a guarantee against a renewal of such atrocities. But Trevor-Roper makes the point that Franco's revolution was not a new "Fascist" revolution. It was a reversion to ancient traditions far more deeply established in the country. These re-established traditions now help to keep Franco in power although Fascism has collapsed.

This is an interesting point. Trevor-Roper argues that Franco made an opportunistic use of fascist language and gave prominence to the Falange when he could profit by supporting Hitler and Mussolini. But as soon as he could, Franco disengaged himself from Fascist protection and reduced the Falange to a mutual benefit society in which the "Fascist" elements were a dissident minority. Franco did not appear as a democrat or as a liberal, he hates both, but as a regent for an old-style clerical monarchy. It can be described as an ancient Bourbon monarchy, and Franco not as a dictator in the modern sense, but as a regent.

In his Law of Succession, promulgated in 1947, he declared Spain to be a "Catholic, social, representative state which in accordance with its traditions is hereby declared to be constitutionally a monarchy."¹⁷ Trevor-Roper explains this anomaly in that Spain did not share Europe's intellectual experiences or its economic growth. As a result it lacked a well-developed middle class and has hardly known the liberalism of such a class when it is rising or the fascism which is often a symptom of its decline.

Franco has shown himself to have far greater political understanding than anyone expected of him when he first fought his way to power. Inconspicuous, cautious, thinking carefully before acting, he is generally two steps ahead of his rivals. He has effectively prevented any possible opponent from approaching his position of power. The Cortes is completely managed by him. It can legally reject a Government measure, but it has never done so. The Falange is ultimately under his control. He is Generalissimo of the Army. In these positions he has shown himself to be the master of any threat to his own leadership. He has been able to manipulate, balance, cajole and pension to such a degree that he alone rules and no one in Spain can see any alternative to him.

Opposition in Spain is expressed in "movements," and in "tendencies" which seek not to overthrow the regime, which would open the door to civil war, but to transform it from within. Inside the Falange,

¹⁷ Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Franco's Spain Twenty Years Later," New York Times, September 2, 1956, p. 34.

which has shed much of its Fascist character and has become a vast system of patronage, a freemasonry of job-seekers and job-givers, there is a movement of social radicalism which preserves some of the original idealism of the "crusade." Within the Church there is a Christian Democratic movement led by Dr. Angel Herrera, Bishop of Málaga, which protests against the materialism and the privileges of the established Church.¹⁸

There are many who resent the lack of liberty, the corruption and illiberality of a personal regime which they feel is beneath the dignity of a proud and civilized people. But none of these "movements" seeks to overthrow Franco. They all would prefer to achieve their aims by influence, not by revolution. Nevertheless the disturbances, the student riots, discontent in the Army and in industry are caused in part by this concern for the future.

There is a two way flow of ideas both into and out of Spain. The various United Nations bodies that have met in Spain have reported freely on conditions in the country. It is true that several news correspondents have run afoul of the regime but Franco does want the United Nations' seal of approval on his administration. The argument can be made that internal conditions are better than they would have been without the spotlight of publicity that goes along with the reports disseminated and published by the various agencies of the United Nations. There is no question that there has been a liberal trend in Spain, especially since the end of World War II.

¹⁸Ibid.

In the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations, Spain has been in the forefront. She has been among the first to volunteer troops, as she offered to do in the Hungary and Suez crises. In speeches in the United Nations her representatives have shown a deep sense of history and of the need for progress in the international sphere. The frequent references to Vitoria and Suárez are coupled with a determination to do Spain's share in maintaining the peace. In fact, her major criticism of the United Nations has been its lack of effective machinery to enforce its decisions. Nevertheless Spain has been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the United Nations since becoming a Member.

In closing it can be pointed out that the old argument that Spain does not have the economic and social structure to build a democracy is gradually becoming invalid. The university students and the intellectuals are basically liberal. There is a maturity about the present day Spaniard. He is more stable, more balanced, more European in his outlook, more middle-class than he has ever been.

Below the surface, a reconciliation of the Spanish people has been taking place, very gradually, but it has been a continuous process. Those who fought against each other in the Civil War are losing their bitterness toward each other. Those who are under 35 years of age do not remember the war and are not moved by it. It is precisely this younger generation that carries the hopes and aspirations of Spain as she makes rapid strides to overtake the remainder of the Western European community.

The first step in the process is to identify the problem. This is often done by the project manager, who will typically lead a team of stakeholders in a series of meetings to discuss the problem and its potential causes. Once the problem has been identified, the next step is to develop a plan of action. This plan should outline the specific steps that will be taken to address the problem, as well as the resources that will be required to implement the plan. The plan should also include a timeline for the project, as well as a list of the key milestones that will be used to track progress. Once the plan has been developed, the next step is to implement the plan. This involves carrying out the specific tasks that have been outlined in the plan, and monitoring progress as the project moves forward. Finally, the last step in the process is to evaluate the results of the project. This involves comparing the actual results of the project to the goals that were set at the beginning of the project, and identifying any areas where further improvement is needed.

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